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ARTICLES 
 DEEP SECRECY  
David E. Pozen∗ 
This Article offers a new way of thinking and talking about government 
secrecy. In the vast literature on the topic, little attention has been paid to the 
structure of government secrets, as distinct from their substance or function. Yet 
these secrets differ systematically depending on how many people know of their 
existence, what sorts of people know, how much they know, and how soon they 
know. When a small group of similarly situated officials conceals from outsiders 
the fact that it is concealing something, the result is a deep secret. When members 
of the general public understand they are being denied particular items of 
information, the result is a shallow secret. Every act of state secrecy can be located 
on a continuum ranging between these two poles. 
Attending to the depth of state secrets, the Article shows, can make a variety of 
conceptual and practical contributions to the debate on their usage. The 
deep/shallow distinction provides a vocabulary and an analytic framework with 
which to describe, assess, and compare secrets, without having to judge what they 
conceal. It sheds light on how secrecy is employed and experienced, which types 
are likely to do the most damage, and where to focus reform efforts. And it gives 
more rigorous content to criticisms of Bush administration practices. Elaborating 
these claims, the Article also mines new constitutional territory—providing an 
original account of the role of state secrecy generally, as well as deep secrecy 
specifically, in our constitutional order. 
 
∗ J.D., Yale Law School, 2007. I am grateful to Steven Aftergood, William Baude, Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Eric Citron, Kristen Eichensehr, Louis Fisher, Chad Flanders, Justin 
Florence, Amanda Frost, Hannibal Kemerer, Jeremy Kessler, Stephen Lilley, Elizabeth Prelogar, 
Jared Thompson, Lee Tien, James Lindley Wilson, and David Zionts for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t 
know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and 
other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. 
 — Donald Rumsfeld1 
 
In October 2001, the Attorney General reversed the Justice Department’s 
presumption in favor of disclosure for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) record 
requests.2 In March 2003, the President issued an executive order permitting the 
reclassification of previously declassified documents.3 In fiscal year 2008, 
executive branch agencies reported 23,421,098 combined classification activities, 
breaking a record set the previous year.4 Throughout the presidency of George W. 
Bush, his administration consistently withheld information from members of 
Congress and from investigative bodies,5 subjected FOIA users to long delays,6 
and claimed the authority to refuse to comply with statutes and treaties in cryptic 
signing statements and in nonpublic opinions by the Office of Legal Counsel.7 
Which, if any, of these acts of secrecy posed the greatest threat to democratic 
values and to good government? Which offended the Constitution? How would one 
even go about comparing and evaluating these secrets? 
In this Article, I argue that Donald Rumsfeld’s taxonomy holds an 
underappreciated answer to these questions. The statement quoted in the epigraph 
has already drawn a great deal of attention, but not for this reason. Almost from the 
moment of its utterance, commentators have ridiculed Rumsfeld for his kabbalistic 
logic and professorial cant.8 The British Plain English Campaign called it “the 
1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.  
2. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to the Heads of All 
Fed. Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
archive/oip/011012.htm.  
3. Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2004).  
4. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2008, at 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2008-annual-report.pdf. 
5. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., SECRECY IN 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 68-81 (2004) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT].  
6. See id. at 26-28. 
7. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562-63, 1591-99 (2007). 
8. See, e.g., HART SEELY, The Unknown, in PIECES OF INTELLIGENCE: THE EXISTENTIAL 
POETRY OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD 2 (2003) (setting Rumsfeld’s remark to satirical verse); “Foot 
in Mouth” Prize for Rumsfeld, CNN.COM, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/WORLD/europe/12/01/rumsfeld.english.reut/ (reporting Rumsfeld’s receipt of an 
international booby prize for the “the most baffling comment by a public figure”). 
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most nonsensical remark made by a public figure” in memory.9 Yet while 
Rumsfeld’s statement was entirely, almost sublimely, unresponsive to the question 
he was asked—“is there any evidence to indicate that Iraq has attempted to or is 
willing to supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction?”—it contained a 
valid insight.10 There are things we know we know, things we know we do not 
know, and things we do not know we do not know. And, in fact, the secrets in the 
latter category tend to be the most difficult ones for a free society. They are deep 
ets. 
Their obscurity in the literature is surprising. The proper scope of government 
secrecy is a classic question in legal and political theory. In recent years, the 
question has taken on special urgency. New technologies and new adversaries have 
increased the potential costs of disclosing government-controlled information,11 at 
the same time as the rise of online media, changing social norms, and a worldwide 
“transparency lobby” have increased the demand for it.12 The Bush administration 
aggressively challenged the gains of the open-government movement and linked 
these efforts to an extreme vision of executive power. The use of state secrets 
appears both more pervasive in practice and more discredited in the public mind 
than at any point in history. Across many parts of the globe, there has never been 
such popular and a
itimate secrecy. 
In the sprawling literature on this topic, a significant aspect has been 
understudied: what we might call the structure of government secrets, as distinct 
from their function, their subject matter, or the competing interests in disclosure 
versus nondisclosure. Sometimes, outside parties are aware that a secret exists even 
though they are ignorant of its content. They know that Agency X is withholding 
photographs of detainee abuse, though they do not know what exactly the 
photographs show.13 The photographs are a shallow secret. Other times, outside 
parties are unaware of a secret’s existence; they are in the dark about the fact that 
they are being kept in the dark. They have no clue that Agency X possesses 
detainee-related evidence of any kind. The photographs are a deep secret. There is 
9. Rum Remark Wins Rumsfeld an Award, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm. 
10. Rumsfeld, supra note 1. Rumsfeld’s remark is somewhat ambiguous as to its subject. 
Although the context suggests it was directed to the challenges of collecting intelligence, the 
reference to “free countries” suggests he may have been invoking the challenges of utilizing 
secrecy as well. Whatever his intent, my project here is not to vindicate Rumsfeld but to apply his 
taxonomy to state secrets. 
11. See David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 650-52 (2005). 
12. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 107-24 (2006) (describing the rise of the international right-to-know movement, facilitated 
by a “transparency lobby” that advocates and utilizes public disclosure laws); Thomas Blanton, 
The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July-Aug. 2002, at 50 (same). 
13. This is the situation presented by the leading government secrecy controversy of the 
moment. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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no bright line dividing deep from shallow secrets, but rather a continuum running 
from one extreme to the other. “Deep” and “shallow” are crude, but useful, 
signifiers for the positioning of a secret across 
ct the nature and degree of its concealment. 
This Article aims to show that attending to the depth of state secrets can make 
a variety of conceptual and practical contributions to the debate on their usage. 
Sociologists and political scientists have distinguished between deep and shallow 
secrets for more than two decades now, and a number of legal scholars have 
applied these ideas to topics in private law.14 Yet, hardly anyone has considered 
the distinction in detail, and even fewer have applied it to secrets of state. When we 
move from the private to the public sphere, the categories of “deep” and “shallow” 
become more problematic, and many borderline cases arise. The notion of depth 
nonetheless enriches our ability to describe, assess, and compare state secrets, both 
in the abstract and, once specific secrets have emerged, on a case-by-ca
s us to think and speak more clearly about things we do not know. 
Part I reviews the literature on deep and shallow secrecy. The scholarship is 
provocative and insightful, but there is not much of it. Part II identifies problems 
with the existing understandings of these concepts, and develops
rous definition for secrets that are kept in a government context. 
Part III moves from the positive to the normative and considers a wide range of 
arguments for and against deep state secrecy. While many substantial arguments 
can be made in defense of governments’ keeping secrets, it turns out to be much 
harder to justify their use of deep secrets. Depth can be instrumentally valuable for 
the secret-keeper, but it is liable to generate perverse consequences, to exacerbate 
the costs of shallow secrecy, and to create a host of distinct harm
t: it is the unknown unknowns we have most reason to fear. 
To reach this conclusion, Part III explores the role of state secrecy generally 
(as well as deep secrecy specifically) in utilitarian, liberal democratic, and 
constitutional theory. Some of this discussion synthesizes arguments many others 
have made; a good deal of it is new to the literature. My hope is that this Part can 
provide a useful framework for a debate that has often concentrated on discrete 
secrecy practices or discrete normative concerns to the exclusion of all others. The 
analysis of secrecy and the Constitution, in particular, marks an original 
contribution. Outside of a few areas—executive privilege, the First Amendment 
and the “right to know,” access to judicial and administrative proceedings—very 
little has been written about secrecy’s place in our 
s to spark conversation on this subject as well. 
Part IV offers a series of practical solutions aimed at minimizing deep secrets 
in government while preserving adequate space for necessary shallow secrets. The 
Bush administration serves as a foil. One of the Article’s key lessons is that the 
space between full public disclosure and maximal opacity is much larger than is 
14. See infra Part I.A. 
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commonly realized, and there are many ways to reduce the depth of state secrets 
without spilling their contents to the wider world. Even reforms that are purely 
internal to the executive branch can go a long way toward moderating depth, and 
thereby toward enhancing the deliberativ
 HAT S EEP ECRECY  REVIOUS EFINITIONS
The distinction between deep and shallow secrets has a distinguished but 
abbreviated pedigree in American legal theory. Beginning with Kim Lane 
Scheppele, scholars have applied the distinction in a variety of private law contexts, 
such as contracts and torts. Very rarely has anyone sought to refine Scheppele’s 
framework—no one has challenged her original definitions—or to consider its 
relationship to public law. The concepts of deep and shallow secr
pletely absent from the literature on government transparency.  
Subpart A summarizes this line of scholarship. Although the phrase “deep 
secrecy” has several popular idiomatic meanings, as explained in Subpart B, it is 
the formal definition articula
In a few pages from her 1988 book Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in 
the Common Law, sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele introduced the concept of a 
deep secret.15 Secrets, according to Scheppele, are items of information that one 
party, the “secret-keeper,” intentionally conceals from another party, the “target.”16 
Sometimes the target of a secret knows or suspects that information is being 
concealed from her, even though she does not know the content of the information. 
She has learned that last week her boss held a closed-door meeting to discuss her 
performance, but she has not learned what was said there. What transpired at the 
meeting is a shallow secret. Other times, the target of a secret is not aware, and has 
no reason to be aware, that something is being kept from her. She has no idea that 
any meeting was held last week. What transpired is a deep secret. Scheppele 
associates these terms with metaphors of light. Whereas the deep secret’s target is 
“completely in the dark, never imagining that relevant information might be 
had,”17 the shallow secret’s targ
ng relevant information.18 
In the realm of interpersonal relations, the depth of a secret is not just a 
15. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON 
LAW 21-22, 75-79, 84-85 (1988). 
16. Id. at 12-16. 
17. Id. at 21. 
18. Id. at 76. 
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practical or epistemological issue; it is also a moral issue. It changes, as well as 
reflects, the relative position of the keeper and the target and the duties they owe 
each other. Because the target of a deep secret has no idea she is being denied 
relevant information, her ignorance allows her “to make stronger justifications 
against the secret-keeper[]” and, if she has a plausible entitlement to the 
information, “a more forceful case that the secret amounts to fraud.”19 Deep secrets 
render their targets especially vulnerable by depriving them of information needed 
to make rational decisions. No amount of vigilance or cleverness would allow the 
target of a perfectly deep secret to defend herself against the keeper, prospectively, 
or to avenge herself, retrospectively. Shallow secrets, by contrast, have the 
important property that they may “be responsive to [the] effort [to learn their 
contents], in the sense that rational individuals can make decisions to search or not 
search for information.”20 Scheppele concludes that deep secrets are presumptively 
unjust and that our laws should reflect this, forbidding them as a default rule a
iring their disclosure in the absence of compelling countervailing reasons.21 
The depth of a secret may also be suggestive of the keeper’s intentions. 
Relative to shallow secret-keepers, deep secret-keepers will generally be more 
concerned to conceal from the target the fact that they wish to conceal something. 
The duplicity entailed by such double concealment may indicate a greater degree of 
embarrassment about the hidden information or a lower regard for the target’s 
interests. Deep secrets, Scheppele implies, will more often involve bad faith. Not 
always, however: consider a surprise birthday party that the host fears will be 
ruined if the honoree gets wind she is planning something.22 Scheppele’s 
distinction has a partial moral motivation. Th
enevolent or paternalistic deep secrecy. 
Although she touches at points on questions of “structurally unequal access to 
knowledge,”23 Scheppele is mainly concerned with how secrets affect transactional 
relationships,24 and the paradigm case for her contractarian theory of disclosure 
law is the contract itself. All of her examples of deep versus shallow secrecy 
involve disputes between private parties.25 Following Scheppele, most scholars 
who have considered deep secrecy have done so in the context of contract law, 
19. Id. at 21. 
20. Id. at 76. 
21. Id. at 84-85, 104. Scheppele does not elaborate how she would translate this principle 
into r
 
her attention to legal secrets involving contending parties whose 
cases
enfo ceable legal rules. 
22. I thank Jim Wilson for suggesting this example.
23. See, e.g., SCHEPPELE, supra note 15, at 120-21. 
24. See Gary T. Marx, The Law’s Secrets, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1614, 1615 (1990) (book 
review) (“Scheppele restricts 
 come before a judge.”). 
25. SCHEPPELE, supra note 15, at 21, 75-79, 84-85. 
26. See, e.g., THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, 
LITIGATION 100 (1997); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 109-11 
(1993); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in 
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what ways the deep/shallow distinction might apply to secrets of state.  
Three subsequent authors (two of them as coauthors) have made this move. In 
an influential book from 1996, political scientists Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson briefly explored the role of deep state secrets in democratic theory.27 
Gutmann and Thompson identify a secret as deep when its existence “is hidden 
from citizens,” and a secret as shallow “when citizens know that a piece of 
information is secret but do not know what the information is.”28 Echoing 
Scheppele, they take as fundamental the feature of shallow secrets that “[c]itizens at 
least have the opportunity to challenge the keepers” and demand disclosure, 
whereas with deep secrets, citizens “are entirely at the mercy of the secret-
keepers.”29 Deep secrets present special obstacles to public scrutiny both of the 
underlying information and of related information that consequently will be less 
likely to emerge.30 This constrains the possibilities for accountability, discourse, 
and political participation. Just as deep secrets present a contractarian problem for 
Scheppele because they impair the ability of the individual to exercise meaningful 
choice, undermining values such as fairness and autonomy, they present a 
democratic problem for Gutmann and Thompson because they impair the ability of 
the citizenry to exercise meaningful oversight, undermining values such as 
deliberation and consent.  
Legal scholar Heidi Kitrosser likewise suggests in a recent article that deep 
secrecy raises special problems for the American polity, not only for democratic 
reasons but also for constitutional ones.31 Based on a variety of textual, historical, 
and structural arguments, Kitrosser concludes that the Constitution is best read to 
disfavor executive privilege claims asserted against Congress.32 She therefore 
believes such secrecy must be minimized, and this entails that “the apparatus for 
information control between the branches should be such as to funnel information, 
to the extent possible, into a state of minimal to very shallow secrecy and away 
from a state of minimal to very deep secrecy.”33 Kitrosser never provides a theory 
of depth—she uses Scheppele’s terms only in passing, “as shorthand”34—and her 
focus never strays far from the debate on executive privilege. But she makes an 
important contribution in linking the deep/shallow distinction to interbranch 
relations and to constitutional values. I shall build on both of these moves in Part III 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 571-72 (2006); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse 
Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1289, 1340-41 (1998). 
27. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 121-23 
(1996). 
28. Id. at 121. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 123. 
31. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 489, 514-15, 542-43 (2007). 
32. Id. at 510-27. 
33. Id. at 515. 
34. Id. at 514. 
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of this Article. 
B. Popular Understandings 
Before proceeding to my own elaboration of deep secrecy, it is worth noting 
that most commentators who employ the term have something else in mind. 
Typically, the phrase is used to mean either an inordinate amount of secrecy or a 
secret that the keeper is particularly keen to conceal. Both of these meanings may 
correlate closely with the depth of a secret, as Scheppele uses the term, and also 
with each other. But they are distinct.  
A secret may be shallow yet nevertheless reflect a very high degree of opacity, 
relative to popular interest or expectations. The New York Times recently argued 
that the practice of closing legislative conference committees to the public gives 
lobbyists too much influence, and that the majority’s “credibility problem lies in the 
deep secrecy . . . that shroud[s] the conference committees.”35 That the Times 
could identify this problem in the first place shows the committees are not in fact 
shrouded in deep secrecy, in the Scheppelian sense. The work of the committees 
must be a shallow secret, or else the Times’s editorial staff would not even think to 
complain about it.  
Similarly, a secret may be guarded with special zeal or cherished in a special 
way by its keeper, yet nevertheless be shallow. The commonplace that someone’s 
most intimate personal details constitute their deepest secrets36 is inapposite in 
Scheppelian terms. It is whether or not the target knows about the secret, not how 
much the keeper cares about it, that matters. There is no necessary relationship 
between the depth of a secret and the value the keeper attaches to it, the 
mechanisms she uses to conceal it, or the propriety and purpose of her actions. 
II. WHAT IS DEEP STATE SECRECY? 
The existing definitions of deep and shallow secrecy are unsatisfying in three 
main respects. 
First, even though Scheppele and her followers imply a strict dichotomy 
between secrets that are deep and secrets that are shallow, no bright line separates 
these categories.37 At one extreme, we can imagine a target who has no clue, and 
35. Editorial, Secrecy as a Spoil of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A20. For similar 
uses of “deep secrecy” to mean inordinate or extreme secrecy, in a generalized sense, see Jim 
Dwyer, Out of Sight, Till Now, and Giving Away Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at B1; Nat 
Hentoff, Fresh Start in ‘09? The Dark Bush Legacy on Secrecy, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at 
A19; Jonathan Schell, American Tragedy, NATION, Apr. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030407/schell. 
36. See, e.g., Karl Fleming, Twilight of a Tough Guy, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at 11; 
Louise Kennedy, Political Satire Waffles with Inconsistencies, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2008, at 
2C; Frank Warren, Secret Thoughts of Travelers, Revealed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at C10. 
37. One previous commentator has hinted at this point. While purporting to adopt 
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no possible means of learning, that an immense body of information is being 
withheld from her. At the other extreme, we can imagine a target who knows in 
detail all of the circumstances bearing on the withheld information and who can 
easily predict and confirm its contents. In between these two poles, how do we 
classify a secret as deep or shallow? What if the target acquires a vague sense of 
her own ignorance? A slightly more concrete sense? If the secret is deep at the 
outset, just how much information must be disclosed or made discoverable, and in 
what way, for the secret to become shallow?  
To ask these questions is to see that the depth of a secret is not necessarily a 
binary feature; rather, depth is determined by a variety of interrelated factors, 
according to which any particular secret may be located on a continuum running 
from maximally opaque to maximally intelligible. Cutoffs may be made along the 
continuum, but criteria must be developed to do so—and even still, complications 
will inevitably arise in the application of general standards to a phenomenon as vast 
and heterogeneous as secrecy. “Deep” and “shallow” can serve profitably as 
proxies, or heuristics, for the rough location of a secret on the continuum. But it is a 
conceptual mistake to see them as wholly discontinuous categories. 
This first concern applies to interpersonal secrecy and state secrecy alike. A 
second problem with Scheppele’s definition applies with special force to the latter: 
the “keeper”/“target” dyad breaks down when one moves from the private to the 
public sphere, for the government contains a multiplicity of actors, linked to each 
other through a multiplicity of channels, pursuing a multiplicity of ends, serving a 
multiplicity of masters. At the level of the state, many different internal groups may 
be aware of the same secret, many more outside groups may have reason to care 
about it, and each may have a distinctive relationship to the information. 
Scheppele’s assumption of unitary agents makes sense in certain private law 
settings, when there are two parties to a transaction and one is concealing 
something from the other. But it is much too simple, and potentially misleading, to 
speak of the keepers and targets of state secrets as monistic categories. These 
concepts, too, must be disaggregated. 
The notion of a target is particularly problematic with state secrets because 
even if the underlying information directly concerns only a small number of 
individuals, all citizens of a democracy may claim a right to access the information, 
simply in virtue of being citizens—persons from whom the government derives its 
authority and to whom the government must be accountable. A policy focused on a 
single foreign leader will nevertheless implicate the American people in the sense 
that the policy is undertaken in their name and financed by their tax dollars. 
Regardless of whether the United States government is “targeting” Americans in 
any conventional sense of the term, it may have moral or legal duties that require 
Scheppele’s distinction between deep and shallow secrets, Heidi Kitrosser adds that the two differ 
in “degree,” not kind, and that secrets may be not only deep or shallow but also “minimally” or 
“very” deep or shallow. Kitrosser, supra note 31, at 493-94, 514-15; see also id. at 515 (stating 
that these terms are necessarily beset by “imprecision”). 
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some amount of disclosure.38 
Finally, there is the problem of how to fix an appropriate level of generality for 
the analysis, which I will call the problem of specification. To determine the depth 
of any given secret, to measure its secretiveness against any set of external 
standards, one must first determine what constitutes the secret and the relevant 
informational background against which to understand it. At a high enough level of 
generality, hardly any secret is deep. If every employee knows her boss will at 
some point assess her performance, no employee can claim to be one-hundred 
percent surprised to learn that her boss held a closed-door meeting for this purpose. 
If everyone in the world knows the President is trying to defeat the terrorists, no 
one can claim to be one-hundred percent surprised to learn that he used any 
particular means toward this end. Yet plainly, we experience some secrets as more 
accessible or obscure, more predictable or shocking, shallower or deeper, than 
others. We constantly (if often passively) make judgments that certain social facts 
sufficiently cohere to comprise a unified thing, an item of information, even if 
information does not come packaged in stable units. And we constantly make 
judgments that certain items are more or less secretive than others, even if they are 
all embedded within larger webs of social facts that are familiar. 
I cannot offer any categorical answer to the problem of specification, although 
Subpart C argues that the concepts of notice and social expectations can help us to 
draw relevant distinctions. We should always bear in mind that in evaluating any 
given secret, we are implicitly specifying a level of generality at which to 
conceptualize what the keepers have done, and that depth may depend on the level 
of generality that is chosen. It is particularly important to appreciate this problem in 
the context of state secrets, given that a vast matrix of public rules, norms, policies, 
and pronouncements overlays virtually every nonpublic act that officials take in 
their professional capacity. 
To refine the distinction between deep and shallow secrecy and to apply it to 
the government context, it is necessary to develop a new definition: one that retains 
Scheppele’s emphasis on the knowledge asymmetries between the parties and the 
ability of relevant outsiders to access the information, but that recasts the distinction 
in more quantitative than qualitative terms. It is necessary to ask not just whether a 
secret is deep or shallow in the Scheppelian sense to any particular individual or 
group, but also how deep or shallow it is to society as a whole.  
The most productive way to conceptualize the depth of a state secret, I 
propose, is to evaluate it along four main indices, reflecting (1) how many people 
know of the secret, (2) what sorts of people know, (3) how much they know, and 
(4) when they know. To be “deep,” a secret must have certain traits corresponding 
38. In fact, the truly proximate targets of many state secrets—those individuals or groups 
against whom the state plans to take hostile action—will often have a weaker claim to the 
concealed information than the average citizen. Certainly as a matter of customary law and 
democratic theory, the government has a lesser duty to make information available to foreigners 
than to citizens, even if the foreigners may be more immediately and negatively affected by the 
content. 
POZEN 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/20/2010 4:34 PM 
268 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:257 
 
to each index. Let us examine them in turn. 
A. How Many People Know 
The first, and most straightforward, factor that determines a state secret’s depth 
is the number of people who know that there is something they don’t know. When 
fewer members of a community are aware of the existence of a secret, the secret is 
more opaque to the community at that moment in time and therefore intrinsically 
more secretive. It is deeper. 
The secret is also more likely to stay opaque. There will be fewer opportunities 
for leaks, fewer opportunities for new parties to discern its contents through effort 
or accident, and fewer opportunities for dissensus regarding its disclosure and 
implementation. As the circle of people aware of a secret expands, it becomes more 
likely that the secret will be compromised both directly—because there are more 
parties who might purposefully or inadvertently illuminate the secret to others—
and indirectly—because there will be more communications by and among insiders 
from which outsiders can glean information. Those in the circle who do not know 
the secret’s full contents will be able to coordinate with a growing body of 
colleagues in evaluating the information they do have, allowing them to draw on 
more extensive expertise to identify new inferences and develop progressively 
richer estimates of the information they lack.39 
Consider a quintessential deep secret: a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plot 
to assassinate the prime minister of a foreign country (“Prime Minister X”) that no 
one outside the agency and a few White House officials has any reason to 
suspect.40 As more and more individuals are apprised of the CIA’s plot, the 
39. See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY 
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007) (explaining how diversity of 
viewpoints facilitates problem-solving); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE 
MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, 
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004) (explaining why, under certain conditions, groups 
may be superior at aggregating and processing information than any single member would be on 
her own); infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the “mosaic theory”). For the size 
of a group aware of a shallow secret to foster publicity, it is not necessary that the group as a 
whole be better than each of its individual members at discerning the secret’s contents. In many 
cases, the mere fact that anyone in the group discerns the contents, or that the group average 
moves closer to a correct estimate thereof, will be enough to compromise the secret. 
40. Lest this example seem overly fanciful, see COMM’N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING 
GOV’T SECRECY, REPORT, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 26 (1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN COMMISSION 
REPORT] (describing executive branch “unacknowledged special access,” or “black,” programs, 
the very existence and purpose of which are classified); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED 
ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. NO. 94-465 (1975) [hereinafter 
CHURCH COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT] (detailing the CIA’s lead role in several 
assassination plots). Shortly before this Article went to press, news reports revealed that in recent 
years the CIA developed but did not implement plans to assassinate al Qaeda leaders. See Mark 
Mazzetti & Scott Shane, After 9/11, C.I.A. Had Plan to Kill Qaeda’s Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 2009, at A1.  
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intelligence professionals serving Prime Minister X will have more and more 
chances to learn of it through espionage, leaks, and public sources. If the plans 
move from deeper to shallower secrecy such that a broader group of people 
becomes aware something is underfoot—say, through the President’s 
announcement that the United States will remove Prime Minister X “by any means 
necessary” unless he cedes power, or through a newspaper’s disclosure that the 
United States is considering an unspecified type of covert action against an 
unnamed foreign leader—the odds of publicity will increase further still. 
Thousands of engaged citizens can pool their collective knowledge to devise a list 
of likely methods and targets and thereby home in on the plot to assassinate Prime 
Minister X.  
In Scheppelian terms, then, the greater the number of individuals within a 
community aware of an otherwise deep secret, the greater the likelihood that the 
secret will become shallow to the entire community; and the greater the number of 
individuals aware of a shallow secret, the greater the likelihood that the secret will 
cease to be a secret at all. On instrumental as well as intrinsic grounds, numerosity 
is linked to publicity. 
B. What Sorts of People Know 
It is not enough, however, to focus on the number of people who are aware of a 
secret; the composition of this group must also be taken into account. Within an 
entity such as the federal executive branch, there exists a tremendous diversity of 
actors. Dozens of departments, agencies, and commissions, each in turn composed 
of dozens of offices and directorates, pursue specific institutional roles. 
Bureaucratic, political, and ideological factions may develop within and across all 
of these units. Many executive agencies employ at the same time a professional 
class of civil servants, a temporary class of appointed officials, and a quasi-
autonomous class of internal monitors such as inspectors general and professional 
responsibility officers.41 On multiple dimensions, the government is not a 
monolith. Even if we assume that no members of the general public are aware of a 
particular secret, it can matter critically which government officials, from which 
offices, are keeping it. (It also matters which private sector actors are aware, 
although with many secrets of state we might expect that there will be very few.) 
To illustrate this point, let us return to the CIA assassination plot. If, outside of 
the White House, only the CIA’s leadership is aware of its existence, the secret will 
be protected not just by the small number of people who know but also by the type 
of people who know: intelligence officers who work for the same agency; who are 
likely to share similar backgrounds, objectives, and moral constraints; and who 
operate in an environment with strong norms of secrecy. By temperament, training, 
41. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Organization Chart, http://www.usdoj.gov/dojorg.htm 
(last visited July 14, 2008); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Organizational Chart, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/orgchart.htm (last visited July 14, 2008). 
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and design, CIA personnel are good at concealing things. 
Now, let us assume that several lawyers from the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
are informed that some sort of assassination plot is in the works. These lawyers will 
bring a different perspective to the contemplated policy, both because of their 
distinctive skill-sets and socialization and because of their distinctive institutional 
responsibilities. The DOJ lawyers also have a duty to serve the President and to be 
mindful of national security, but their primary charge is to enforce the law. 
Assassinating foreign leaders is prohibited under domestic and international legal 
authorities (which is one reason the plot’s secrecy is so deep).42 One might 
therefore predict that the DOJ lawyers will object to the plot and seek to have it 
called off. If the lawyers are unable to stop the plot on their own, they may take 
their arguments to other executive officials, further widening the circle of secret-
keepers. Admitting a mere handful of DOJ lawyers into the deliberations may 
dramatically change the expected outcome of the concealed information. 
As this example suggests, the type of officials who are aware of a secret is 
relevant not only to the odds that the information will be disseminated to the 
broader public but also, and more basically, for the process by which the 
information will be considered within government and for the manner and extent to 
which public interests will be represented in this process. Consistent with 
Scheppele’s insight that the distinctive normative concern with deep secrets lies in 
the way their keepers unilaterally arrogate power, it should diminish depth when 
more different types of actors are in a position to demand a secret’s disclosure and 
to challenge the policy decisions that may be derived from it. There may be no neat 
formula with which to differentiate relevant “types” or to quantify their status. But 
we can say generally that the depth of a secret decreases as the number of types of 
actors aware of its existence increases. 
C. How Much They Know 
Motivating Scheppele’s definition of deep secrets is the fact that they will 
never prompt their target to search for the concealed information. The target lacks 
the capacity to make a reasoned decision whether to do so, because she does not 
know what she does not know.43 Scaling this idea up to the level of state, Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson stipulate that if citizens know or suspect that a 
particular set of officials is considering a course of action, but do not know what 
the officials have decided, that course of action is a shallow secret. If no one knows 
or suspects as much, the course of action is a deep secret.44 
42. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982); Major Tyler J. Harder, 
Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying 
Current Law, 172 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002). There are vigorous debates over what qualifies as 
assassination and whether assassination for reasons of self-defense is ever permissible under 
international law that need not concern us here. 
43. SCHEPPELE, supra note 15, at 21, 75-76. 
44. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 121-22. 
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Yet in this respect, too, a straightforward application of Scheppele’s definition 
to state secrecy may obscure more than it illuminates, because in reality it will 
rarely be the case that the citizenry, as a whole, is either completely aware of or 
completely in the dark about a secret. Instead, the content of most state secrets will 
be known to a subset of officials, unknown but discoverable to another group of 
officials and possibly laypersons, and unknown and undiscoverable to a third group 
of officials and laypersons. In Scheppelian terms, state secrets will often be 
simultaneously deep and shallow across the population. It would not be very 
enlightening to say that a state secret is deep whenever some citizens lack the 
capacity to make an informed decision whether to seek out the hidden information, 
and shallow whenever some citizens have this capacity. Both may be the case. It is 
more helpful to say that the depth of a secret decreases to the extent that members 
of the community, including their representatives in government, understand that 
information is being concealed from them, the basic contours of that information, 
and how to go about discovering what it is.45 
The concept of notice is central to this understanding of depth. Citizens and 
their representatives can be completely ignorant of a particular secret’s contents, yet 
aware of the process by which the secret has been created and protected. For 
instance, the rules for classifying and declassifying executive branch information 
are now set forth in a published executive order.46 The rules are highly general and 
do not provide much insight into the substance of classified documents. But they 
make the act of classifying any particular document less obscure, because the 
process by which that act of secrecy occurs is itself a matter of record. “Second-
order” publicity rules of this sort give citizens a platform for participating in the 
development of “first-order” secrets, which affords them a degree of 
comprehension and control.47 Such rules can thereby decrease depth. 
They do not do so in a constant way, however, because second-order publicity 
45. On this dimension of depth as on the previous two, the secrets that score lowest will be 
those about which the entire community knows a tremendous amount but has no official 
confirmation: what might be termed open secrets. These are still secrets, in the thin sense that the 
government will not substantiate the information. But the public is in on the secret, and the 
government knows that the public knows. Open secrets are longstanding favorites of repressive 
regimes. Everyone in Stalin’s Soviet Union was aware that certain acts could land him or her in a 
labor camp, even though the list of offenses was nowhere codified. See LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI, 
MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: THE FOUNDERS, THE GOLDEN AGE, THE BREAKDOWN 864 (P.S. 
Falla trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1978). It was important to the Communist Party that this 
awareness be fostered, so that the populace would be scared into compliance, but also that the list 
not be officially acknowledged and thereby exposed to public scrutiny or foreign criticism. Id. 
Requiring the Soviet people to deny known facts such as the role of labor camps allowed the Party 
to conscript them into a shared authorship over the falsehood and a shared complicity in the 
underlying policies. Open secrets may raise serious problems for a regime’s legitimacy, but a 
different sort of problem from those raised by deep secrets. Open secrets can be seen as extremely 
shallow secrets. 
46. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003). 
47. See Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 185-86, 192-93 
(1999). 
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will not always give rise to the same degree of notice about first-order material. 
Regimes of second-order publicity permit certain types of information to be 
concealed pursuant to certain criteria. Some first-order secrets will fall in the 
heartland of what everyone assumed they were authorizing in setting up such a 
regime: Americans expect that the government uses undercover agents to spy on 
foreign terrorists and that documents identifying these agents will be classified. But 
other first-order secrets will not be so easily anticipatable. The American people 
might have no inkling that the government is doing certain things, might even 
believe that they had prohibited the government from doing those things, and the 
classification system can maintain this ignorance. 
Consider Gutmann and Thompson’s example of the United States 
government’s radiation experiments on human subjects during World War II.48 
Congress had publicly declared war against Germany and Japan, and the President 
was visibly leading the war effort. Everyone was on notice that the President, as 
commander-in-chief, would be devising military tactics to prosecute the war and 
that the precise content of some tactics would be kept secret to prevent the enemy 
from gaining an advantage. So, contrary to Gutmann and Thompson’s assertion, 
weren’t the government’s radiation experiments (inasmuch as they were conducted 
in the service of the war effort) quintessentially shallow secrets? Gutmann and 
Thompson do not explain why they believe the experiments were deep secrets, but 
it must be because the content of the experiments was so unexpected. The 
technology enabling the experiments was so new, and the decision to test it on 
human subjects so stunning, that the American people and their representatives did 
not have effective notice that such conduct might be occurring. Compared to the 
President’s decision, say, to bomb certain German cities rather than certain other 
ones, the regime of second-order publicity governing military strategy did not 
likewise prepare the American people for the decision to conduct radiation 
experiments. Indeed, the American people might have felt differently about the 
decision to declare war if they had known such devastating weapons could be 
unleashed as a result of that decision.  
This example shows how depth is determined not only by the formal processes 
that maintain a secret but also by the functional understandings that accompany 
those processes. The example also helps illuminate the problem of specification, by 
showing how depth can turn on how broadly or narrowly one defines the 
information that constitutes the secret.49 Having declared war, the fact that the 
government was developing a more efficient means to wage war may have been 
entirely predictable. But the fact that it was developing any particular means may 
have been entirely unpredictable, at least to non-experts. Whether one considers the 
atomic bomb program to be deep or shallow will depend upon what one considers 
the relevant unit of analysis: the fact of a weapons development program (which 
everyone anticipated) or the fact of a weapons development program focused on 
48. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 121-22. 
49. See supra pp. 267-267 (setting out the problem of specification). 
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nuclear technology (which, we are assuming, hardly anyone could have 
anticipated).  
Smaller first-order decisions taken by officials may be entirely opaque to 
regular citizens, even if they are embedded within larger first-order or second-order 
decisions that are themselves public or anticipatable. Like the atomic bomb 
program, those smaller decisions can still be deep secrets if the known information 
has not provided meaningful notice of their existence. 
D. When They Know 
The final factor that influences the depth of a secret is time. A secret may be 
extremely deep for an initial period, but then made progressively shallower in 
stages, as it is disclosed to more and more persons in more and more detail. How 
deep or shallow one considers the secret will therefore depend on the temporal 
frame one adopts. Time does not directly change depth as do the other factors; 
rather, time complicates the depth calculus because the other factors change with its 
passage. 
If a fundamental concern with state secrecy is that the people may become 
disconnected from actions taken by their own government, it makes sense to focus 
on the window of time before a secret plan is put into effect. Disclosures that give 
relevant actors an opportunity to influence a secret’s usage will decrease depth 
more than disclosures that occur after the policy formulation window has closed. 
Hence, in the case of the CIA plot to assassinate Prime Minister X, it would be 
reasonable to consider the plot a deep secret even if the general public learns about 
the plot immediately after the assassination has occurred.50 The veil of secrecy will 
have been lifted too late. 
In certain instances, it may be preferable for government officials to delay 
disclosure of their secrets, lest premature transparency undermine the policy the 
secret was meant to facilitate. Although delayed disclosure is in theory a second-
best solution, because the secret-keepers will be deprived of input during the 
critical phases of policy development and execution, in practice it may be the best 
option. In assessing the depth of a secret, however, what matters is not whether the 
timing of disclosure was optimal, but whether the disclosure occurred within or 
beyond the policy formulation window and by how much. 
E. A New Definition 
Even if no bright line separates deep secrets from shallow ones, we can still 
coherently label a secret as “deep” or “shallow” if it lies sufficiently far to one side 
50. Such post hoc disclosure is not inevitable. In the CIA’s case, it would violate the 
doctrine of “plausible deniability,” whereby covert operations are performed “in such a way that if 
discovered, the role of the United States could be plausibly denied.” CHURCH COMMITTEE 
ASSASSINATION REPORT, supra note 40, at 3, 11-12. 
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of the depth continuum. Synthesizing the analysis above, we can say that a 
government secret is deep if a small group of similarly situated officials conceals its 
existence from the public and from other officials, such that the outsiders’ 
ignorance precludes them from learning about, checking, or influencing the 
keepers’ use of the information. A state secret is shallow if ordinary citizens 
understand they are being denied relevant information and have some ability to 
estimate its content. 
More concretely, we can say that depth is mitigated by the total number of 
people who know something is being concealed, the number of types of people 
who know, the amount they know, and the speed with which they know. If no one 
outside of a particular executive branch unit knows of a program the unit is 
running, the program is an extremely deep secret. If the general public knows all 
but a few details, the program is an extremely shallow secret. If the program is 
disclosed to the other branches of government, but not to the public, it lies 
somewhere in the middle of the depth continuum. Illegal programs will tend to be 
deeper secrets than legal ones, all else equal, given the assumption that laws are 
followed. Programs cloaked in cover and deception, whereby officials take active 
steps to mislead observers, will likewise tend to be deeper. 
This definition builds on Scheppele’s by refining her key insights and adapting 
them to an institutional context. It permits us to discriminate among state secrets on 
the basis of their overall accessibility, without passing judgment on their content. 
And it carries the important implication that some secrets may be known only to 
government actors and yet nevertheless be less deep than other secrets that are 
known to a different set of government actors. While one fairly bright line 
continues to separate deep from shallow state secrets—the public always is aware 
of the existence of the latter, ignorant of the former—the depth discrepancies 
between many secrets will be more quantitative than qualitative.  
Just from this definition, we can see that deep secrecy in the United States 
government is much more likely to be an executive, rather than a congressional or 
judicial, phenomenon. Congress and the judiciary exercise their authority largely 
through public processes, by holding hearings and trials, confirming or rejecting 
appointments, issuing opinions, passing legislation. Secrecy does exist in both 
branches—indeed, I believe congressional secrecy is a seriously understudied 
subject—but the structures that channel and constrain legislative and judicial 
authority generally demand that it be shallow.51 Another overlooked factor 
51. Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for 
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 920 n.41 (2006) (comparing executive and 
legislative secrecy). To be more precise, although deep secrecy may exist in the legislative and 
judicial branches with respect to deliberative machinations, it is highly unlikely to exist with 
respect to their final decisions. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (distinguishing 
consummated from deliberative deep secrets).  
As Adam Samaha suggests, the intelligence budget is the obvious counterexample in 
Congress. Samaha, supra, at 920 n.41. Yet while the intelligence budget provides a dramatic 
example of congressional secrecy, it is not especially deep secrecy. Everyone knows of the 
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militates against deep congressional secrecy: the fact that Congress contains 
representatives from more than one political party. Each party has an incentive to 
expose controversial or inappropriate actions of the other, which creates an 
additional structural bar to unjustified concealment. The executive branch lacks this 
basic pro-openness feature.52 
We can also see that deep secrecy may be most likely to occur, and to raise the 
most vexing problems, in the area of national security. National security policies 
often have a true target in the colloquial sense of a party against whom the 
government is taking adverse action. Publicizing information about these policies 
therefore poses a special risk of vitiating the underlying objective. National security 
policies also involve matters of life and death, as well as some of the most morally 
and legally controversial activities taken by government, and therefore raise the 
stakes of secrecy generally. If a basic reason for keeping a secret deep is to deprive 
outside parties of the capacity to protest the hidden policy or to take responsive 
measures, national security policymaking is a natural field in which to expect 
officials to gravitate toward depth.  
III. THE PROBLEMATICS OF DEEP SECRECY, OR WHY RUMSFELD WAS 
RIGHT 
As the previous Part suggested, the depth of a secret will often have 
consequences for how the concealed information is (or is not) utilized by the state. 
Even within a single branch of government, alerting a larger number and wider 
range of actors, earlier in time, in greater detail, to the existence of a secret—and 
thereby decreasing its depth—can change the processes that apply to the 
information and the policies that emerge from it. Decreasing a secret’s depth will 
not necessarily lead to better outcomes, but it will systematically lead to different 
outcomes: outcomes that are deemed acceptable from a greater variety of 
perspectives, that have been more thoroughly reasoned and refined through a 
dialogic vetting process, that are better documented, that take longer to be finalized, 
and that are more likely to be publicized. Does this tend to increase or decrease 
social welfare? To facilitate or frustrate democracy? Are there constitutional 
implications? 
My thesis in this Part is that on utilitarian, democratic, and constitutional 
grounds, deep state secrecy ought to be seen as especially troubling. Good 
budget’s existence, many people know the rough contours of what it includes, and members 
of Congress and the executive can view the budget itself. See generally STEPHEN DAGGETT, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET: A BASIC OVERVIEW (2004). I am 
skeptical that any of the government texts that commentators describe as “secret laws” are 
very deep secrets. To have any effect on the lived world, these “laws” must be disclosed at 
least to those who would enforce them, which ensures some nontrivial degree of numerosity, 
if not also institutional diversity, in the types of actors who are aware of their content. More 
likely to be deep secrets are discrete government activities taken pursuant to or in 
contravention of public or quasi-public laws. 
52. But cf. infra Part IV.C (explaining structural divisions within the executive branch). 
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arguments can be made under all three standards in defense of governments’ 
keeping secrets. It turns out to be much harder to extend these arguments to deep 
secrets. To some extent, this conclusion simply follows from the fact that deep 
secrets are especially secretive. The normative concerns raised by state secrets, I 
will show, tend to increase in rough proportion to their obscurity. To some extent, 
however, this conclusion reflects features of deep secrets that are distinctive. When 
Donald Rumsfeld observed that the unknown unknowns “tend to be the difficult 
ones,”53 he may have spoken truer than he knew. 
Several caveats are in order. First, even though I explained above that the 
depth of a secret is best conceptualized along a continuum, I will be discussing 
deep and shallow secrets here largely in dichotomous terms. I do this because deep 
secrets are my specific evaluative subject, as well as for analytic clarity and for ease 
of exposition. Many of the arguments I make for and against deep secrets could be 
extended to deeper secrets. Second, I will be discussing these issues at a fairly high 
level of abstraction. Given my goal of theorizing deep state secrecy as a unified 
phenomenon, I need to paint with a broad brush. One claim I make is that it is 
valuable to home in on the deep/shallow distinction precisely because it allows us 
to move beyond case-by-case analysis to derive overarching, content-independent 
principles with which to assess secrecy practices. 
Third, and relatedly, I will not be comparing secrets on the basis of their 
content or specifying a level of generality at which to evaluate them. It is 
impossible to address these issues satisfactorily in the abstract. State secrecy can 
take an infinite variety of forms, and one might weight the normative analyses quite 
differently if the secret at issue involves only extragovernmental actors (e.g., 
information the government has acquired about adversaries), or the personal lives 
of officials, or purely ministerial matters. Some shallow secrets may be highly 
problematic on account of their subject. Some deep secrets may be benign. Rather 
than try to limn every potentially relevant substantive distinction, I will restrict the 
analysis to secrets used in the formulation or administration of executive branch 
public policy, broadly defined. There are no universal answers or mechanical 
formulae when it comes to judging state secrets. Appreciating the deep/shallow 
distinction may help clarify the normative questions raised by any particular secret. 
It cannot in itself answer them. 
A. Utilitarian Theory 
1. Secrecy and utilitarianism 
At least since Jeremy Bentham, the dominant cast of the literature on 
government secrecy has been utilitarian. Both its critics and defenders have tended 
to make arguments about consequences—to view transparency as an instrumental, 
53. Supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
POZEN 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/20/2010 4:34 PM 
January 2010] DEEP SECRECY 277 
 
rather than intrinsic, good and to evaluate openness policies on the basis of how 
they affect societal well-being.54 In support of secrecy, four broad types of 
consequentialist arguments are made. 
First, state secrecy may prevent bad actors from accessing information that 
could be used to harm national interests or to reduce the effectiveness of 
government policies. This is the quintessential justification for state secrecy: to 
preserve the state itself. Some amount of secrecy may be valuable for concealing 
plans and vulnerabilities from adversaries, acting quickly and decisively against 
threats, protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering, and investigating 
and enforcing the law against violators. Some amount of secrecy may likewise be 
necessary for preserving the integrity of lotteries, elections, market interventions, 
and other government functions that rely on anonymity or timing.  
Second, secrecy may enhance the quality of governmental deliberations and 
decision making. Secure in the knowledge that their comments will not be made 
public, policymakers may have more freedom to consider and debate different 
options, to take risks, to change their minds, to rely on experts, to conduct 
negotiations with outside parties, and to avoid “bad accountability” to narrow 
interest groups while preserving “good accountability” to the broader public.55 
Counterintuitively, secrecy can protect against the ossification of administrative 
practices and lead to more informed regulation.56  
Third, secrecy may protect privacy and associated values. The United States 
government controls an enormous wealth of information about individuals and 
organizations and even more information about its employees, the disclosure of 
which may cause psychic, reputational, and tangible harm to those concerned.  
Finally, secrecy may be cheap. Compared to a transparency regime that 
requires case-by-case determinations of whether to publicize or protect items of 
information, a more categorical policy of opacity may be inexpensive to administer. 
54. See Paul Gowder, Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the 
Security State, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 2 (2006) (“The academic (particularly legal 
academic) and public discourse on government secrecy is overwhelmingly produced in the mode 
of utilitarian expediency.”); Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1556, 1557-58 & 
n.11 (2008) (adopting this view and providing citations to authors doing the same). Useful 
summaries of the costs and benefits of government secrecy include MOYNIHAN COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 40, at 6-9; SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND 
REVELATION 18-26, 102-15, 171-209 (Vintage Books 1989) (1983); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 894-910 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of 
Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 894-98 (1986). 
55. The concepts of “bad accountability” and “good accountability” are developed in 
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the U.S. Budget Process, in FISCAL 
CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 68, 83-87 (Elizabeth Garrett 
et al. eds., 2008). 
56. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2006, at 12 (arguing that too much transparency in government leads to a 
fixation on procedure rather than substance, a shuttling of decision making into informal back 
channels, and a privileging of the status quo). “Opacity,” Stuntz asserts, “is essential to a 
government that moves, acts, makes things happen.” Id. at 14. 
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Against these potential benefits, utilitarian critics of state secrecy raise 
powerful arguments. First, by inhibiting input, oversight, and criticism within and 
outside government, secrecy and compartmentalization will often lead to lower-
quality policies. Even when the secret-keepers are perfectly virtuous, debate and 
dissent may be muted, important facts and insights may be overlooked, and 
preexisting biases may be amplified. Policymaking may suffer just as profoundly in 
a field such as national security, the locus classicus of clandestine affairs, as 
excessive secrecy can inhibit critical information sharing and increase vulnerability 
to internal leaks and to deception by sources.57 In the absence of perfect virtue, 
secrecy creates greater opportunities for officials to pursue personal or partisan 
gain, to engage in logrolling or horse trading, and to commit legal and ethical 
abuses. An “instrument of conspiracy,”58 secrecy exacerbates the principal-agent 
problem inherent in representative democracy and opens the door to tyranny. All of 
these criticisms inform the venerable strain of argument running through twentieth-
century American political thought that “sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants.”59  
Second, and relatedly, secrecy enables the secret-keepers to arrogate power to 
themselves. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, secrecy is a form of regulation, 
used by insiders to magnify their status and influence relative to outsiders.60 Partly 
for this reason, bureaucrats are inevitably attracted to secrecy; secrecy fosters 
interagency rivalries and harms interagency coordination; and secret programs tend 
to expand beyond their initial scope.  
57. Notable arguments on how secrecy can harm national security include MOYNIHAN 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 40, at 8 (explaining that as the size of a secrecy system grows, 
the prospects for leaks grow in proportion); BOK, supra note 54, at 194-96 (discussing “self-
defeating military secrecy”); DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
80 (1998) (concluding, from an extensive review of Cold War history, that “as the secrecy system 
took hold, it prevented American government from accurately assessing the enemy and then 
dealing rationally with them during this and other critical periods”); ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 
42-48, 140-41 (explaining the widespread belief that excessive secrecy reduced our preparedness 
for the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should 
Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 136-39 (2006) (providing 
numerous examples of how openness can promote security). 
58. JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Political Tactics, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
301, 315 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) (1838). 
59. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1913). 
Justice Brandeis’s aphorism has been enshrined in the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 
No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006)), the Sunshine 
in the Courtroom Act of 2009, S. 657, 111th Cong. (2009), the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, 
S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009), and scores of other federal and state information-access laws that use 
the sunlight metaphor in their titles.  
60. MOYNIHAN, supra note 57, at 59, 73; accord MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 40, at xxi. This argument is most associated with Max Weber and his writings on the efforts 
of bureaucracies to entrench their authority through the cultivation of privileged knowledge. See, 
e.g., MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 233-34 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (1946) (“The concept of the 
‘official secret’ is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by 
the bureaucracy as this attitude . . . .”). 
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Third, state secrecy may breed cynicism and suspicion, which in turn may 
weaken legal compliance, social trust, civic participation, and the capacity for 
collective action generally. Secrets distort our relationship to history and to each 
other. They impair a society’s ability to understand the events of its own past and to 
derive lessons from mistakes that were made.  
Finally, maintaining secrecy can be expensive. Although disclosure regimes 
impose administrative burdens, it may be more costly to run a system that classifies 
and protects huge amounts of information while simultaneously reassuring the 
populace that information is not being concealed improperly.61 Given that one 
disclosure by one individual can unravel an entire web of secrets, secrecy needs 
constant tending. 
2. Deep secrecy and utilitarianism 
The arguments just recited are familiar in the literature, if rarely assembled in 
one place. What is not familiar is that deep secrecy is liable to exacerbate all of the 
utilitarian costs of state secrecy, without offering a concomitant increase in 
benefits. While we may lack good methods to quantify or formalize this inquiry,62 
we have good theoretical reasons to predict that relative to a baseline of shallow 
secrecy, deep secrecy will typically be a utilitarian loser.  
On the cost side, deep secrecy raises special problems most basically because 
of the special way in which it handicaps those who are not privy to the secret. Deep 
state secrets leave all but a few individuals ignorant of their own ignorance. The 
threat to good policy is clear. When members of the public and their representatives 
are unaware that information is being concealed from them, their ability to provide 
input, oversight, and criticism relating to that information is not simply inhibited 
but nullified. Nothing but the secret-keepers’ good faith connects them, as agents, 
to their citizen-principals or to other agents in government. Malefactors will find 
deep secrecy especially congenial, on account of the insulation from scrutiny it 
affords. 
The ignorance goes in both directions. Not only will the wider world be 
completely in the dark about the plans and ideas of the secret-keepers; the secret-
keepers will also be in the dark about plans and ideas of outsiders that might be 
relevant to their decision making, because the outsiders will not be prompted to 
61. See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 40, at 9-10 (discussing efforts to 
quantify the financial costs of United States government secrecy and noting various annual 
estimates in the billions). 
62. It would be quite a challenge to test empirically the relationship between the depth of 
state secrets and the quality of policy outcomes. The researcher would have to devise not only 
quantitative measures of depth and quality but also a reliable way to monitor state secrets, to 
assess their impact, and to predict how outcomes would have differed had alternative types or 
amounts of secrecy been used. The study of particular deep secrets would perforce be conducted 
retrospectively, after the relevant information has emerged, and even then one could never be sure 
how those secrets compare to others that may remain entirely unknown.  
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come forward with their contributions. Shallow secrets at least permit outsiders to 
understand the contours of the policies the government is considering, to identify 
key players, and to participate to some extent in a debate over how the concealed 
information should be used. Deep secrets block out all sunlight from the decisional 
process beyond the small circle of secret-keepers. No public reasons need be given, 
no adversarial testing need occur. In addition to corruption and abuse, ideological 
amplification, bias, and groupthink will be more likely to flourish.63  
More speculatively, deep secrets may also exacerbate the social trust, perverse 
consequences, and budgetary arguments against government secrecy. They will not 
do direct damage to social trust so long as they remain deep, for by definition 
people will be unaware such secrets are being kept from them. But when these 
secrets eventually cease to be deep—whether from declassification, disclosure, or 
detection—they can arouse a greater sense of outrage and alienation. People are 
more likely to feel duped by revelations that were not preceded by advance 
warning. Deep secrets are the stuff of conspiracy theories. A government that uses 
them cannot help but engender skepticism. 
Deep secrecy may also be more likely to breed leaks. Unauthorized leaks 
typically occur when a secret-keeper is unhappy with the activities of colleagues 
and cannot have her position vindicated internally. When a secret is shallow, 
disaffected keepers may be able to argue their position to a wide range of persons 
inside, and to some extent outside, government without compromising the secret. 
When a secret is deep, however, disaffected keepers will have fewer such channels 
for dissent and may have no recourse to deter the policy short of full publicity. 
Something like this appears to explain the case of Thomas Tamm, the 
conscientious Justice Department lawyer who exposed the Bush administration’s 
remarkably deep Terrorist Surveillance Program by placing a phone call to the New 
York Times.64  
This possibility complicates the link between shallowness and publicity. As the 
previous Part explained, there are good reasons to assume that alerting a greater 
number of people, in greater detail, to the existence of a secret will increase the 
odds that the secret’s contents will be compromised. But this causal relationship 
need not hold true in all cases, and toward the upper end of the depth spectrum it 
may reverse itself. Shallow secrets tend to unravel gradually, accretively, as 
outsiders piece together clues and pursue further disclosures. The keepers have 
63. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND 
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982) (defining groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when 
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity 
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”). Groupthink can 
lead to suboptimal decision making by “foster[ing] overoptimism, lack of vigilance, and 
sloganistic thinking about out-groups. At the same time, groupthink causes members to ignore 
negative information by viewing messengers of bad news as people who ‘don’t get it.’” Marleen 
A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1258 (2003). 
64. Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40. I will 
return to the Terrorist Surveillance Program in Part IV. See infra notes 280, 289, 308, 310 and 
accompanying text. 
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some time to react. Those deep secrets that become public tend to do so in dramatic 
fashion. 
Finally, the direct costs of maintaining deep secrecy should tend to exceed the 
costs of shallow secrecy. Because even partial disclosures can suffice to 
compromise a deep secret, its keepers may desire more elaborate and expensive 
protections. 
Deep secrecy does not likewise enhance all of the beneficial consequences of 
state secrecy. Let us take first the candor-based justification for secrecy: that 
governmental deliberations can be chilled or distorted by the knowledge that 
outsiders may learn what has been said, and that this will lead to inferior decision 
making. However valid this is as a general justification for secrecy,65 it is not an 
argument for deep secrecy. For government officials to reach collective decisions in 
a less inhibited manner, all that is necessary is that the content of their 
communications be concealed to some extent. Although disclosing the participation 
of specific officials in a specific meeting might spark interest in what those officials 
said, and may even generate counterproductive forms of media speculation and 
political pressure, the officials need not internalize the consequences of publicity so 
long as they can feel confident that their statements will be protected. Everyone 
understands that the United States Supreme Court Justices discuss cases in private 
conferences, making their content a shallow secret, yet the conferences certainly 
seem to sustain reasoned deliberation.  
The distinctive contribution of deep secrecy to the decision making process is 
that it allows officials to shield not only the content of their communications but 
also the fact of their decision making, a type of freedom no utilitarian should 
embrace as a matter of course. There is no need to keep the public and the other 
branches of government completely in the dark about the existence of a decisional 
process for honesty, choice, courage, rationality, and other such values to be 
safeguarded within the process. 
Although this Article has generally avoided categorizing secrets on the basis of 
their subject matter, it may be helpful to introduce an additional distinction here: 
between what might be termed consummated deep state secrets and deliberative 
deep state secrets. The former are deep secrets about actions taken by officials with 
tangible effects on the wider world: deals that were struck, money that was spent, 
troops that were deployed. The latter are deep secrets about the existence of 
predecisional government processes: meetings that were held, memos that were 
circulated, e-mails that were exchanged.66 While consummated deep secrets are of 
65. See Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (2008) (arguing 
that the strength of this justification varies depending on context and should not be given 
unqualified deference).  
66. It is important not to conflate the concept of deliberative deep secrecy—secrecy about 
the existence of deliberations—with the more common (indeed, ubiquitous) phenomenon of 
secrecy about the content of deliberations. If members of the public know that a certain type of 
meeting was held by certain officials, but do not know what was said at the meeting, anything 
discussed therein should not qualify as a deep secret. The meeting is a classic shallow secret; the 
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more obvious concern to the utilitarian, the analysis here suggests that deliberative 
deep secrets are likely to generate related costs. Consummated deep secrets degrade 
the quality of external discourse and are more likely to reflect inferior decisions. 
Deliberative deep secrets degrade the quality of internal discourse and are more 
likely to produce inferior decisions.  
Similarly, deep secrecy does not offer additional benefits for privacy, and 
instead threatens greater harm. Privacy advocates concerned about the 
government’s collection of sensitive personal information often seek to enlist 
secrecy to limit the government’s ability to disseminate that information. Yet while 
these advocates may want the government to be as secretive as possible with the 
information it has acquired, they should want it to be as open as possible about the 
rules that control its collection and dissemination activities. Shallow secrecy allows 
officials to maintain first-order secrets about members of the public—where they 
have lived, with whom they have associated, their social security numbers, and so 
forth—under the terms of a transparent second-order legal process. Deep secrecy, 
by contrast, allows officials to collect, use, and share information without ever 
acknowledging they have done so, through a process the public has never seen or 
approved. It vitiates people’s control over the manner in and extent to which they 
are perceived by (government-employed) others. The explicit threat to privacy may 
not be apparent, but the functional threat is far greater. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
a role for deep secrecy in a privacy regime other than to violate it.67 
Deep secrecy is not purely a destructive force, however. As Dennis Thompson 
has observed, “some policies and processes require obscurity” to be effective, 
because even generalized, “second-order publicity” about the policy or process 
“would destroy its first-order efficacy.”68 In some cases, that is, to make a secret 
shallower would risk defeating the objective that inspired the use of secrecy in the 
first place. What do these policies and processes look like?  
Let us return first to the CIA assassination plot. To achieve the goal of 
outsiders know in broad terms what they do not know. If outsiders could not anticipate the 
substance of particular topics of discussion, those topics will be deeper secrets than those that 
were more anticipatable, but still, the unknown content of a known proceeding is better classified 
as shallow. 
Although we might assume a positive correlation between consummated and 
deliberative deep secrets, there is no necessary connection between the two. Decisions taken 
at an unknown meeting may lead only to public actions. Decisions taken at a widely known 
(but nonpublic) meeting may lead only to covert actions. 
67. Deep secrecy might help officials shield potentially embarrassing details of their private 
lives from the media, which may be attractive to the utilitarian because it leads the press toward 
more productive areas of inquiry or because it makes qualified individuals more likely to pursue 
government service. On the other hand, these benefits may be counteracted by the costs of 
depriving the public of information that might bear on the keeper’s fitness for office. These sorts 
of secrets, relating to the off-duty lives of government employees rather than the decisions taken 
by such employees in an official capacity, are not the focus of this analysis. Arguably, they are not 
even state secrets, just personal secrets. 
68. Thompson, supra note 47, at 186. Thompson does not provide examples of policies that 
have this quality. 
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eliminating Prime Minister X, deep secrecy may well be useful. Alerting persons 
outside the CIA to the existence of a controversial covert action scheme, at 
whatever level of generality, will put them on notice and draw attention to the 
agency. Some outsiders may try to discover the plot; some may try to delay it; 
some may try to thwart it. Suspicious developments in foreign countries will be 
interpreted in new light. Keeping the plot a deep secret would deprive the CIA of 
feedback from the wider world, yet in the business of assassinating people, the CIA 
probably needs no such help. Shallowness would only get in the way. 
Or, let us assume that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
learns of the outbreak of a never-before-seen virus in one portion of the country. 
CDC officials are still studying the reported cases and do not yet know the severity 
of the virus or the means by which it spreads. Alerting people to the virus, even in 
very general terms, might enable them to take useful precautions, but doing so 
would risk creating widespread panic and stigmatizing those who have contracted 
it. Let us further assume that the CDC employs a rigorous internal process, 
undisclosed to the outside world, for determining how to respond to such 
outbreaks. For some period of time, CDC officials may conclude it is better to say 
nothing, lest they create unwarranted fear and havoc. If it turns out that the virus 
poses no health threat to the broader population, this decision may appear to have 
been the correct one. 
These examples show how deep secrecy can enhance social welfare by 
allowing secret-keepers greater freedom to develop and pursue policies without 
reaching premature conclusions or alerting those who would undermine the 
policies. The ignorance of others can have strategic value. Depth can increase 
efficiency, buy time, and maintain the element of surprise. 
In pursuit of these benefits, deep secrecy centralizes responsibility over 
strategic planning and risk management. This approach to information control 
suffers from all of the flaws noted above, but its rationale is coherent. Secret-
keepers will not always have a clear sense of how much shallower they can make a 
secret without precipitating full public disclosure. Nor will they always need 
additional input or oversight, and the political pressures that may ensue, to make 
the best decision. Outsiders who realize they are being denied information may 
make unreasonable or myopic demands on better-informed secret-keepers. 
Furthermore, once government information has been revealed to members of the 
public, it is extremely difficult to put it back in the box. Although First Amendment 
doctrine does not provide much protection for those who leak sensitive 
information, it provides significant protection for those who receive that 
information and then broadcast it.69 The government has little authority to stop the 
press from publishing whatever it can find out.70 
69. See Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of 
Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government 
Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 691-92 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 898-901. 
70. Since 1950, there has been a federal statute that criminalizes the publication of certain 
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From a starting point of deep secrecy, even minor disclosures can prove 
illuminating. As more and more items of information emerge about a secret plan or 
policy, outsiders will have more and more opportunities to draw inferences across 
the items and to relate them to other items of information they possess. Such 
analytic mosaic-making is a basic precept of intelligence gathering, used by our 
government to learn about our enemies and by our enemies to learn about us.71 
When it works, “bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be 
analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole 
must operate.”72 A strategy of deep secrecy, in which outsiders are not told even 
the rudimentary outlines of what the government is up to, deprives adversaries of 
material that might be used in a harmful mosaic. Apart from its susceptibility to 
abuse and its lack of a limiting principle,73 a serious weakness of this strategy is 
that it likewise prevents citizens and allies from doing mosaic-making of their own, 
from assembling pieces of information in ways that can improve policy 
outcomes.74 Sometimes this may seem insufficient compensation. Moving a secret 
from deeper to shallower can create greater risks as well as rewards. 
However, if these examples show why deep secrecy might hold appeal as a 
model for information control, they also point to a fundamental difficulty with the 
utilitarian defense of the practice. It assumes not only that deep secrecy will 
facilitate superior outcomes, but also that deep secret-keepers are the appropriate 
body to decide what constitutes a superior outcome. Which is preferable: That the 
CIA faces more or less resistance regarding a plot to assassinate a foreign leader? 
That the CDC forestalls a potential panic or that members of the public are allowed 
to review some of the medical evidence and take whatever precautions they see fit? 
There is no obvious mechanism for evaluating these tradeoffs, because embedded 
within each are normative considerations of value and priority alongside 
technocratic considerations of instrumental rationality. Even if we could predict 
with confidence the effects of disclosure, it may not be easy to discern which 
outcome would conduce to greater social welfare (or happiness, or preference 
classified information concerning United States intelligence activities, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2006), but 
it has hardly ever been deployed by prosecutors. See Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2008, at 31, 32-34 (discussing § 798 and the “government’s practical inability 
to enforce this law against the press”); see also MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 94 (2d ed., rev. 2002) (noting the 
“media’s natural bias in favor of complete openness”). Although the press will occasionally sit on 
sensitive information for weeks or months at the government’s request, the possibility of such 
journalistic self-restraint cannot give much comfort to the secret-keepers. 
71. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 630-34, 664-66 (explaining the mosaic theory). 
72. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
73. Pozen, supra note 11, at 664-74. 
74. See id. at 673-74, 677 (discussing the potential for “positive” mosaic-making); see also 
Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1011, 1060 n.188 (2008) (speculating that the Bush administration relied so heavily on 
the mosaic theory because it feared that concerned citizens—“‘mosaic artisans’ in the person of 
investigative reporters rather than astute terrorists”—would be the ones to piece together 
disclosures). 
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satisfaction, or whatever other utilitarian standard one might adopt).75 Deep secret-
keepers do not necessarily have any special expertise in this regard. On account of 
its resources and experience, the CDC may have a unique ability to identify the 
public-health costs and benefits of early versus delayed disclosure about viruses. It 
has no special expertise at weighing the costs and benefits alongside other relevant 
consequentialist considerations, on this or any issue. Yet, by declining to inform 
anyone from the White House, Congress, or the public about its plans, the CDC 
would effectively assume sole authority over this determination. 
The utilitarian case for deep secrecy thus rests on two highly problematic 
assumptions. First, it assumes that given a specific goal, government secret-keepers 
will reliably use deep secrecy to make better decisions toward that end than they 
would have in the presence of greater input, participation, and oversight. This 
assumption is problematic because, as explained above,76 we have numerous a 
priori reasons to expect that deep secret-keepers will not in fact make superior 
decisions and that, even relative to shallow secret-keepers, their insularity will 
instead lead to suboptimal and self-interested decision making.  
Second, it assumes that secret-keepers will reliably use deep secrecy to pursue 
goals that are themselves the correct goals. This assumption is problematic because 
it assigns responsibility over these judgments to a small, and possibly arbitrary, 
group of officials, and because it assumes a stable metric of social welfare, which 
“neglects the contribution of publicity to the desirability of the policy”77 and to the 
determination of what would make for a desirable policy. Shallow secrets moderate 
these concerns through the notice they provide to outsiders. Deep secrets license 
their keepers to decide courses of action in the interests of people who have never, 
except in the most attenuated and formalistic sense, had any say in the matter. 
Although it would be wrong to maintain that deep state secrecy categorically 
produces inferior outcomes, the rule-utilitarian case in its favor appears as 
precarious and narrow as the case against appears clear and robust. The broader 
lesson is that consequentialist justifications for any particular use of deep secrecy 
should be met with great skepticism. 
B. Liberal Democratic Theory 
1. Secrecy and liberal democracy 
The other main strain of argument against state secrecy is non-consequentialist 
75. Geoffrey Stone has argued that given the diversity and incommensurability of interests 
at stake in government secrecy policies, cost-benefit analysis is “so fraught with ambiguity” that it 
quickly becomes “unmanageable . . . in practice.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR 
GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK 2-3 (2007). Implicit in Stone’s argument on the limits of 
utilitarian analysis is the need to look to other, non-consequentialist values as well.  
76. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. 
77. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 103. 
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in character. It emphasizes (in varying degrees) the democratic values of popular 
sovereignty and government accountability and the liberal values of choice and 
consent. These arguments have deep roots in Western political thought. Many of 
the modern era’s most important political thinkers—from Locke, to Rousseau, to 
Kant, to the Founding Fathers—and virtually all of the normative schools of 
democratic theory—from contractarians, to deliberativists, to libertarians, to 
republicans—have viewed transparency as a critical component of popular 
legitimacy and moral government.78  
Seen in a different light, all of the main utilitarian arguments against state 
secrecy can be recast as liberal or democratic arguments. By concealing the 
activities of officials, secrecy reduces the ability of the people and their 
representatives to monitor those activities and to identify and debate relevant issues 
in an informed manner. By giving officials greater leeway to pursue unpopular and 
unethical policies, secrecy reduces the cost of adopting such policies, fosters elite 
rule, threatens the rule of law, and magnifies the power of government over the 
individual. By denying citizens the information they need to make rational and 
deliberate decisions about the institutions that govern them, secrecy undermines the 
basis for consent. Secrecy fosters ignorance and suspicion. “It is based on a mistrust 
between those governing and those governed; at the same time, it exacerbates that 
mistrust.”79 Through numerous mutually reinforcing mechanisms, secrecy 
weakens the link between members of a polity and their leaders.  
A government operating in secret is not only more likely to take immoral 
actions; its use of secrecy is itself a moral problem. State secrecy can deny citizens 
the ability to exercise their rights and liberties, to be free from the unjust and 
coercive exercise of power, and to understand the world around them. It threatens 
the project of collective self-determination. None other than Richard Nixon put this 
point well: “When information which properly belongs to the public is 
systematically withheld by those in power, the people soon become ignorant of 
their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them, and—eventually—
incapable of determining their own destinies.”80 
78. See Mark A. Chinen, Secrecy and Democratic Decisions, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 3-8 
(2009) (summarizing canonical liberal democratic arguments on behalf of government 
transparency); Fenster, supra note 54, at 895-99 (same); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a 
Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1144-47 (2007) (same). Despite this rich vein of theorizing, Dennis 
Thompson has observed that contemporary scholars rarely address secrecy from a systemic 
perspective. “[M]ost of the literature on government secrecy,” Thompson wrote in 1999, “neglects 
the fundamental democratic values underlying the problem and focuses instead on the laws and 
policies that regulate secrecy, patterns of abuses by individual officials, or particular practices such 
as executive privilege and national security.” Thompson, supra note 47, at 181-82. 
79. Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of 
Transparency in Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999, at 
115, 116 (Matthew J. Gibney ed., 2003). 
80. ROZELL, supra note 70, at 15 (quoting President Nixon). The hedge here lies in the 
phrase “which properly belongs to the public.” Under the expansive view of executive power that 
Nixon would later espouse, see id. at 54-71, much information was considered not to “belong” to 
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Far less has been written about the democratic case in favor of state secrecy.81 
One can imagine arguments on democratic grounds for any number of specific 
types of secrets. For instance, many would agree that it is good for democracy to 
keep certain juvenile records under seal so that low-level offenders have a chance 
to enter adulthood without social taint, to withhold election results until after the 
polls have closed so that voting behavior is not skewed, or to take any number of 
measures to protect individual privacy. Arguments of this sort tend to be highly 
content dependent, however, and do not hold up across substantive categories. Can 
there be a systemic democratic justification for state secrecy?  
It is easily overlooked, but there is at least one very basic justification, rooted 
in popular consent. If the public has voted to install any particular regime of 
secrecy, and thereby authorized certain officials to keep certain types of secrets in 
certain ways, those officials can be said to be carrying out their popular mandate 
when they do so. As the previous Subpart elaborated, state secrecy can contribute 
to a wide range of social goods—from deliberative candor, to strategic surprise, to 
administrative efficiency—and it is therefore rational for citizens to seek some 
measure of it in their governing structures. With secret activities, there can never be 
fully informed consent, because if the activities were publicly announced ahead of 
time, there would no longer be any secret to protect. This is what Dennis 
Thompson has dubbed the “Heisenberg uncertainty principle”: secret-keepers are 
precluded from garnering the direct assent of the public, because to do so would 
risk forfeiting the very advantage that the keepers think the public would want them 
to preserve.82 Secret-keepers can never be one-hundred percent sure that their 
decisions would survive the glare of publicity. 
Nevertheless, if the public expressly grants someone the authority to keep 
certain secrets, and if the grantee faithfully applies that authority subject to post hoc 
review, it is fair to see this exchange as a victory for democracy, not simply as a 
concession to practical necessity. The most defensible cases are those that are least 
analogous to the Scheppelian adversarial paradigm, when the secret is of general 
character and the keepers sincerely and reasonably believe the public would want 
them to protect it.83 Secret decisions may have inherent deliberative and 
the public but rather to the President alone.  
81. Rather than make an affirmative democratic case for state secrecy, commentators have 
more often rebutted democratic objections to the practice by asserting that the government “owns” 
the information it creates and controls, much like a private citizen might own information. See id. 
at 9 (noting the recurring use of this argument by American officials); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 
916-18 (discussing and rejecting this view). The analogy to private ownership in this context 
strikes me as very unattractive. It reifies the government in regard to a legal concept (intellectual 
property) meant to respect personhood and to stimulate market competition and creative output, it 
disables criticism, and it profoundly offends principles of popular sovereignty when the concealed 
information concerns affairs of state. 
82. Thompson, supra note 47, at 182. 
83. Other cases more closely approximate the Scheppelian paradigm. For instance, the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted to require that prosecutors reveal 
potentially exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants, even if the defendants have no way of 
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participatory deficits that preclude robust democratic legitimacy. But under the 
right conditions, even government activities hidden from the public can claim a 
respectable democratic pedigree and help effectuate the project of popular self-rule. 
2. Deep secrecy and liberal democracy 
As with utilitarianism, deep secrets exacerbate all of the standard liberal 
democratic criticisms of (shallow) state secrecy. They keep outsiders in a more 
profound state of ignorance, depriving the public of any means to learn about, 
check, or influence the underlying information and blunting its capacity to seek and 
comprehend related information. The secret-keeper has that much more room to 
pursue impermissible or inappropriate ends, through the use of impermissible or 
inappropriate means. Because the executive branch controls the greatest amount of 
sensitive information and has the greatest ability to operate in secret, deep secrecy 
allows it to magnify its power relative to the other branches, corroding checks and 
balances and obscuring internal policy debates. Congress and the judiciary may 
never learn of information needed to perform their respective functions; policies 
may persist despite widespread opposition in the legislature or a high likelihood 
that courts would hold them unlawful. Values such as impartiality, legality, and 
compassion may be trampled on with impunity. 
That much is straightforward. By exaggerating the knowledge and power 
asymmetries between the secret-keepers and everyone else, depth can undermine 
accountability, deliberation, and consent and thus attenuate a secret’s connection to 
standard sources of democratic legitimacy. Deep secrets carry forward the pre-
modern legacy of arcana imperii, mysteries of state the sovereign could invoke to 
justify his absolute authority and “to secure domination over [an] immature 
people.”84 They may also threaten liberal democratic values in several additional, 
distinctive respects. 
First, deep state secrets are more likely to offend the Kantian publicity 
principle and the liberal safeguards it incorporates. In a celebrated passage of 
Eternal Peace, Kant proposed as “the transcendental formula of public law: ‘All 
actions which relate to the right of other men are contrary to right and law, the 
maxim of which does not permit publicity.’”85 For Kant, disclosing a policy to 
knowing the evidence exists. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). This disclosure 
requirement tracks Scheppele’s contractarian arguments against deep secrecy in proceedings 
between two parties, only here one party is the state. 
84. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 52 
(Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991) (1962); see also BOK, supra note 54, at 172-73 
(tracing the ecclesiastic origins of the principle of arcana imperii, later appropriated by 
secular leaders to preserve an “aura of sacredness” and thereby to forestall democratic 
scrutiny and sentiment). 
85. IMMANUEL KANT, Eternal Peace, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL 
KANT’S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 430, 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949) (1795); 
see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 97-105 (explaining Kant’s publicity principle 
and defending it on moral and deliberative grounds); David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in 
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those affected guards against their instrumentalization and the violation of 
substantive principles of justice such as fairness and rationality; it is also a 
necessary condition, or test, of that policy’s morality. A policy cannot be just if 
permitting publicity would defeat its purpose. 
The perverse feature of deep secrets from a Kantian perspective is that they 
may be valuable to officials precisely because publicity would defeat their purpose, 
whether noble or base, as to disclose even generalized facts about the policy would 
compromise it. This is at once the fundamental consequentialist rationale for deep 
secrets and, for Kantians, their fundamental defect. Because no one outside of a 
small, cohesive circle is aware of their existence, deep secrets relieve their keepers 
of the burden of reason giving. There can be no public defense of deep secrets, no 
case made to the parties who may be affected, because if any such case could be 
made, then the secret should not be deep in the first place. Paradoxically, the best 
justification for keeping deep secrets is that they cannot be justified to others.  
Second, and relatedly, policies shrouded in deep secrecy (i.e., consummated 
deep secrets)86 are more likely to offend the value of autonomy. When one’s 
government adopts a policy that could not have been anticipated, one is conscripted 
into unwitting support for the policy as a citizen, taxpayer, and observer; as time 
goes by, official silence shades into outright manipulation and misrepresentation. 
Deep secrets can transform the lived world in important yet obscure ways. If the 
CIA were to conduct its assassination plot in deep secrecy, members of the general 
public, Congress, and other executive branch agencies would have no idea the plot 
had ever been contemplated. One day, Prime Minister X is alive, the next day dead, 
and no one outside of the CIA would understand why. Where in reality there is 
logic and motive, people will see only chance and circumstance. People will 
experience the world as arbitrary, or will assign mistaken reasons to the events they 
perceive, when in fact there is a hidden order. Such profound misunderstandings 
may compound over time.  
Shallow secrets at least put members of the public on notice of the gaps that 
exist in their knowledge. They can learn the general contours of the material that is 
being withheld and can frame the decision problems that face them. The world is 
not entirely knowable but it is not entirely mysterious either. 
Finally, deep secrets raise special democratic concerns in their deficits of 
representation. Representation is always imperfect in a political system. Given the 
heterogeneity of the electorate, the slack in selection and accountability 
mechanisms, and the unpredictability of human events, no one subset of 
government officials can ever claim to represent “the people” unproblematically. 
Rather, in Bruce Ackerman’s figuration, every set of officials “re-presents” the 
people in a different, incomplete way.87 When the policymaking process is more 
THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996) (providing a detailed 
historical and critical exegesis of the publicity principle). 
86. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
87. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 179-86 (1991). 
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multivocal, when more different types of the people’s agents have a seat at the 
table, that process might therefore be considered more democratic—a richer 
simulacrum of the town-hall meeting that is practically infeasible as a means of 
reaching decisions in a modern polity. 
This is true even within a single branch of government. If the CIA keeps 
Justice Department lawyers apprised of an assassination plot, it connects the plot to 
a review mechanism that has itself been established by elected officials in a public 
process. The assassination plot remains opaque to the citizenry in a direct sense—
they still know and suspect nothing—but it is less obscure in an indirect sense, in 
that a different subset of government actors can apply the laws and values of the 
polity to the information. The connection between the secret and the people 
becomes a little more robust, the exercise of authority a little less arbitrary and 
contingent. The representation-reinforcing potential of shallowness is even greater 
across the branches. Bringing members of Congress or the judiciary into a secret 
not only introduces new forms of oversight and accountability; it also subjects the 
secret to new and qualitatively different forms of representation. In multiple 
respects, then, widening and diversifying the circle of keepers can enhance a 
secret’s democratic credentials, even if the secret itself is never revealed to the 
demos. 
Deep state secrets, by contrast, lack the intra-keeper pluralism that can help 
foster reasoned, public-spirited decision making and offset any external democratic 
deficits. Even among the subset of secrets about which the public knows nothing, 
the comparative insularity of the deeper ones, the smallness and cohesiveness of the 
group that keeps them, can pose a distinct threat to democratic values. 
Can there be a liberal democratic justification for deep secrecy? It is hard to 
see how. I suggested above that a general defense of state secrecy may resort to 
hypothetical or constructive consent.88 Even if members of the public have not 
actually blessed the contents of a particular secret (as they never have), officials 
may have positive legal authority to take the covert measure and persuasive reasons 
to think that people would have blessed it, had they been able to do so. It would 
take a severe proceduralist account of democracy to condemn the official who acts 
in good faith on this assumption rather than pass up a course of action that likely 
would have commanded widespread support. 
88. See supra pp. 287-288. A few authors have also explored ways in which secrecy may be 
democracy-enhancing within government. For example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
describe a category of secrets, which they call “secrecy in the service of deliberation,” that permit 
officials to engage in more extensive deliberation than would be possible with greater 
transparency. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 114-17. The obvious justification for 
these secrets is not democratic but utilitarian—that they will facilitate superior policy outcomes—
but Gutmann and Thompson plausibly suggest that augmenting the quality of bureaucratic 
discourse can serve democratic values even when it comes at the expense of popular discourse. 
Whether one evaluates the quality of intragovernmental deliberation from a utilitarian or 
democratic perspective, deep secrecy should appear similarly unattractive. As explained supra 
Part III.A.2, shallow secrecy can suffice to provide many of the deliberative benefits that a 
clandestine decision making process might afford, without all of the drawbacks. 
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This logic breaks down with deep secrets. First, deep secret-keepers have a 
weaker epistemic basis for gauging public sentiment. A government official who 
believes the public would have consented to a deep secret cannot have any robust 
basis for so believing. If she had revealed enough information or widened the circle 
of keepers enough to test that assumption, she would have made the secret 
significantly shallower. 
Second, and more critically, the obscurity of deep secrets calls into question 
the possibility of any meaningful form of consent or precommitment. By installing 
a regime of second-order publicity, a people can decide democratically at Time 
One how much and what kinds of transparency to sacrifice at Time Two, even if 
that loss of transparency means the public will not necessarily know at Time Two if 
it approves or disapproves of the specific actions the government is taking, and 
may have to wait until Time Three to evaluate them. There is a tension here, but it 
can be seen as just one facet of the general paradox of legal constraints in a regime 
committed to popular sovereignty.  
But can a people decide democratically to sacrifice so much transparency that 
government activities will be not only unknown but also unknowable? To allow a 
small, homogeneous group of officials to pursue policies that others will have no 
ability to learn about, check, or influence? Given the virtual impenetrability of deep 
secrets, the impossibility of subjecting them to external constraints, a decision to 
authorize their keeping involves not so much a delegation of administrative 
discretion as an abdication of collective agency—an abandonment of self-rule on 
the matters at stake.89 Arguably, there is no rational way to consent to future 
actions about which one will not have the faintest understanding. 
None of this is to suggest that government policies must always be visible or 
subject to immediate popular control. These are impossible standards for modern 
democratic decision making. The problem with deep state secrets is that they do not 
satisfy more basic procedural and substantive criteria for democratic legitimacy. 
Deep secrets entail serious deficits in ex ante authorization by citizens and their 
elected representatives; partly as a result, they also entail serious deficits in ex post 
accountability. There can be no reliable expectation that they will foster equal 
treatment or even rationality. They facilitate an excessive concentration of power, 
which can constitute domination and which upsets the balance of mixed authority 
that gives the government a claim to being politically egalitarian.  
From this perspective, a popular decision authorizing the President to keep 
deep secrets would not suffice to legitimate the practice, as it would license him to 
violate norms that are themselves constitutive of democratic rule. It would be like a 
vote to give up the right to vote, or to protest, or to demand fair and reasonable 
treatment from government. Like an attempt to contract away an inalienable right. 
It is not even clear that a statute purporting to authorize deep secrecy could have 
89. Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 265-66 (1999) (arguing that 
precommitment justifications cease to be useful in democratic theory “[o]nce it becomes unclear 
or controversial what the people have committed themselves to”). 
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sufficiently meaningful or intelligible limiting principles to warrant the label “law.” 
The best liberal democratic argument for deep secrecy, if one can call it that, 
must therefore resort to bootstrapping. Sometimes, perhaps, government officials 
will have to violate fundamental norms of transparency in pursuit of the collective 
safety and well-being, so that democracy can flourish within the space that remains. 
They will have to impoverish the public sphere to preserve the public square. This 
argument from necessity accepts deep secrets as inherently evil, yet sometimes the 
lesser evil. We are back to consequentialism, or at least to a state of exception. As a 
matter of ideal theory, there is no democratic justification for deep secrets. 
C. Constitutional Theory 
1. Secrecy and the Constitution 
If you asked most American legal scholars about secrecy’s role in the 
Constitution, they would probably say that it has none. The text mentions “secrecy” 
only once, in an obscure clause,90 the Framers had relatively little to say on the 
subject, and throughout the vast part of our history “few have seen constitutional 
issues in governmental concealment.”91 It was not until the 1970s, in the wake of 
the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War, that any significant number of 
lawyers began to ask whether state secrecy (and its opposite, transparency) might 
be a value of constitutional dimension. Those who have done so have focused on 
two questions: the President’s authority to withhold information requested by 
prosecutors or by Congress, and the existence and extent of judicially enforceable 
rights, anchored in the First Amendment, to access government institutions such as 
prisons and criminal trials. The courts have held that the President is entitled to 
withhold certain types of information and that the public is entitled to observe 
certain official proceedings, but the boundaries of these rights are highly 
unsettled.92 In the law reviews as in the court reporters, critical thinking is in a 
nascent stage. Although a great deal has been written about executive privilege, 
First Amendment access claims, and specific historical controversies, hardly 
anything has been written about secrecy’s broader place in our constitutional 
order.93 
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (Journal Clause). 
91. Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon 
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 276 (1971). 
92. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 994 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (stating that “the bounds of [executive privilege] are unclear”); Fenster, supra 
note 54, at 889 (“[T]ransparency’s status as a legal obligation for government entities in the 
United States and as an individual right for American citizens is remarkably vague.”); Heidi 
Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information 
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2008) (noting “widespread uncertainty as to whether 
Congress constitutionally may force the President to disclose information”). 
93. I am aware of only one work, by Adam Samaha, that has considered secrecy’s 
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In this Subpart, I will try to nudge the ball forward by arguing that under each 
of the standard methods of constitutional interpretation—text, history, structure, 
prudence, and doctrine94—the Constitution does speak to the issue of state secrecy, 
and that under each there is a colorable case to be made both for and against a 
constitutional norm of government openness. Along the way, I will try to 
synthesize the disparate strands of existing scholarship and suggest a variety of new 
interpretive moves that might be made. 
a. Text  
Start with the text. There are three main textualist routes to the conclusion that 
the Constitution guarantees some kind of access right to government information: 
extrapolating a broader principle from the scattered references to secrecy and 
publicity, evaluating Congress’s enumerated powers in relation to those of the 
executive, and deriving from the First Amendment a right to receive as well as to 
express ideas. (Already, the discerning reader may glimpse that while these are 
textual arguments, in that they are rooted to specific language in the Constitution, 
the motivating insights might be better classed as structural.)95 
The document’s only explicit reference to secrecy appears in Article I, Section 
5’s Journal Clause, which provides: “Each House shall keep a Journal of its 
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may 
in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . .”96 The Journal Clause contemplates 
legislative secrecy, but only as a deviation from a norm of publicity; the 
Constitution’s sole grant of a secrecy power is coupled to an anterior duty of 
disclosure. As a baseline, the clause instantiates the view expressed by James 
Wilson at the Constitutional Convention that “[t]he people have a right to know 
what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the 
constitutional status from a systemic perspective, looking to the document as a whole and not just 
to a particular textual provision, doctrinal line, or category of information-access dispute. See 
generally Samaha, supra note 51. Mark Rozell and Heidi Kitrosser have taken similarly broad 
views in their insightful studies of executive privilege. See generally ROZELL, supra note 70; 
Kitrosser, supra note 31. 
94. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-92 (1982) 
(identifying these as the five standard modalities of constitutional argument). While Bobbitt’s 
taxonomy can of course be disputed, it is comprehensive and “widely accepted,” Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1303, 1312 (2008), and so provides an attractive if artificial tool for organizing this 
overview. Bobbitt himself introduced a sixth modality, ethical argument, BOBBITT, supra, at 93-
119, which has not gained widespread acceptance but which I will touch on briefly in conjunction 
with the historical and prudential analyses below.  
95. Cf. BOBBITT, supra note 94, at 7 (noting that the various types of constitutional 
argument “are really archetypes, since many arguments take on aspects of more than one type”).  
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. The Constitution contains no reference to “executive 
privilege,” the “state secrets privilege,” or any other terms we now associate with government 
secrecy.  
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Legislature to conceal their proceedings.”97 Additional guarantees of publicity 
appear in Article I, Section 9, which provides that “a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published 
from time to time”;98 in Article II, Section 3, which provides that the President 
“shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary 
and expedient”;99 and in the Sixth Amendment’s right to a “public trial” in 
criminal proceedings.100 Pursuant to these provisions, each branch of government 
is assigned a duty of publicity that relates to a core institutional responsibility—
collecting and spending public funds (Congress), providing lawmakers with 
relevant information and guidance (the executive), and conducting criminal trials 
(the judiciary). These parallel obligations, together with the Constitution’s relative 
silence on secrecy, might suggest a broader norm of open government. 
With respect to the President’s authority to keep secrets, a textualist might find 
it especially significant that, in contrast to Article I, Article II contains no reference 
to “secrecy.” The Framers evidently knew how to provide for secrecy when they 
wanted; perhaps this discrepancy suggests that the executive branch possesses no 
corresponding power to use it. With respect to the President’s authority to withhold 
information from Congress, a textualist might also note the many ways in which 
the former appears subordinate to the latter in the provision of means for carrying 
out its responsibilities.101 Congress is given the power of the purse,102 the power 
to create or abolish executive offices and departments,103 the impeachment 
power,104 and the necessary-and-proper power to make all laws for “carrying into 
Execution” its enumerated powers as well as “all other Powers vested by [the] 
Constitution in the Government of the United States.”105 In light of all these 
97. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 260 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND]. 
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
99. Id. art. II, § 3. 
100. Id. amend. VI. 
101. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of 
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1153-69 (1999) (providing numerous textual 
arguments why “the President does not possess the constitutional authority to command the means 
of ensuring the complete utilization of [his own constitutional powers]”). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
103. There is no specific textual basis for this power. Conventional wisdom derives it from 
a combination of the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and the reference to the 
President’s authority to appoint officers “established by Law” in Article II, Section 2, id. art. II, § 
2, cl. 2, which carries the negative implication that the offices themselves must first be created by 
legislation. Whether and to what extent Congress may create executive agencies independent of 
the President is more hotly contested.  
104. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
105. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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enumerated powers prodding Congress to oversee and respond to the actions of the 
executive, one might think it odd that the President would nonetheless have the 
right to deny a legislative request fo
Suggestive as they may be, the foregoing arguments rely on interpretive 
inferences many would be unwilling to make. The Journal Clause appears to grant 
legislators unreviewable discretion to conceal proceedings (“as may in their 
Judgment require”),106 the Constitution does not define the “Information of the 
State of the Union” that the President must share with Congress,107 and each of its 
textual guarantees of publicity is limited in scope (to legislative proceedings, 
appropriations, presidential-congressional intercourse, or criminal trials). For the 
vast majority of open-government proponents, it has therefore fallen to the First 
Amendment—and its guarantees of free speech, a free press, and the freedom to 
petition—to provide a textual hook for a generalized, context-independent right to 
know what the government is up to. This argument has gained traction in recent 
years. Drawing on an influential 1976 piece by Thomas Emerson,108 a number of 
scholars have argued that as a corollary to the negative rights it establishes, 
allowing Americans to be free from certain forms of government intervention, the 
First Amendment also establishes a “right of the public to obtain information from 
the government.”109 This right could be operationalized any number of ways. A 
weaker form, institutionally, would require a presumption of access to those 
proceedings (such as trials) and institutions (such as prisons) that involve the 
exercise of the state’s coercive authority. A stronger form would require the 
government to publicize information it creates and controls even when no relevant 
formal process has been visibly initiated. 
Like virtually everyone who has made the argument, Emerson did not see the 
“right to know” as an absolute, and he allowed that it could be overcome for 
reasons of national security or privacy.110 But he did see the right to know as an 
all-encompassing right, in that it would extend to all members of the public and, “as 
a starting point, to all information in the possession of the government.”111 To 
bolster this reading of the First Amendment, one might look also to the Guarantee 
Clause112 and to the Constitution’s provision for the election of Senators, 
Representatives, and the President.113 For federal elections to be meaningful, and 
106. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
107. Id. art. II, § 3. 
108. Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1. 
109. Id. at 14; see also Fuchs, supra note 57, at 140 & n.40 (citing numerous works 
“argu[ing] in favor of a [First-Amendment-based] right to know information about the 
government”). Emerson himself drew heavily on Alexander Meiklejohn in developing this 
argument, though he parted company with Meiklejohn in important respects. See, e.g., Emerson, 
supra note 108, at 4-5, 14. 
110. Emerson, supra note 108, at 16-17. 
111. Id. at 16. This is so because “[i]t is hard to conceive of any government information 
that would not be relevant to the concerns of the citizen and taxpayer.” Id. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
113. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (Senators); art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (Representatives); art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3 (the 
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then it would seem to follow that, for some amount of time, they need do no such 
 
for states to have republican government in any realistic sense, the people must be 
aware of what their officeholders have been doing. Otherwise, they will have no 
sound basis on which to cast their votes. 
Against these arguments for a constitutional right to government information, 
there are impressive textualist rejoinders to suggest that such a right, if it exists, 
may be substantially limited. The most basic rejoinder is that the document simply 
does not include the magic words: apart from the Journal Clause, it never once 
obliges any government entity to let the people know what it has been up to. Other 
constitutions state a publicity principle.114 The constitution of the Czech Republic, 
for instance, provides that “[o]rgans of the State and of local self-government shall 
provide in an appropriate manner information on their activity.”115 Albania’s 
constitution states baldly that “[t]he right to information is guaranteed.”116  
Not only do our Constitution’s discrete references to publicity fail to ensure 
any generalized right to know; an intratextualist117 might well conclude that they 
point against such a conclusion. First, the interpretive canon of inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other) might suggest 
that where publicity is not so invoked, the omission should be seen as significant. 
For example, the right of criminal defendants to a public trial might be taken to 
imply a lack of such a right in non-criminal cases.  
Second, with the exception of the Sixth Amendment’s public trial requirement, 
each of the Constitution’s textual guarantees of publicity—in the Journal 
Clause,118 the Statement and Account Clause,119 and the State of the Union 
Clause120—is modified by “from time to time.” In those few places where the 
document demands publicity, it uses an identical formula to authorize temporal 
gaps in the exercise of that duty. If Congress need only publish a journal of its 
proceedings and a statement of its accounts from time to time, and if the President 
need only give Congress information on the state of the union from time to time, 
President). In those settings in which information access bears on the ability of an individual or 
group to exercise its substantive rights, one might look also to the Due Process, Equal Protection, 
or Privileges and Immunities Clauses. 
114. My understanding of comparative constitutional law on secrecy, and the examples I 
cite, derive almost entirely from Adam Samaha’s valuable discussion of the subject. Samaha, 
supra note 51, at 923-32. 
115. Id. at 924. 
116. Id. at 924 n.60 (alteration in original). According to Samaha, “at least two-dozen 
foreign constitutions now explicitly command some degree of public access to government-held 
information or records,” though these commands are often tempered by explicit access 
restrictions. Id. at 923. 
117. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (elucidating the 
intratextualist interpretive methodology, which emphasizes recurring words and phrases as 
privileged sources of meaning). 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
119. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
120. Id. art. II, § 3. 
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 further textualist rejoinder centers on Article II. Notwithstanding Congress’s 
man
b. History 
The insights we can glean in this area from any form of originalist analysis are 
limit
 
thing.121 Nor can the First Amendment necessarily pick up the slack. In the context 
of a document that calls for representative democracy, rather than direct 
democracy, and an Amendment that traditionally has been read to protect only 
negative liberties, rather than positive liberties, it does not necessarily follow from 
the guarantee of free speech and a free press that the government must proactively 
make information available to facilitate public discourse. The words of the First 
Amendment can bear this understanding, but they cannot in themselves compel 
it.122 
A
y powers relating to national security and foreign affairs,123 the President 
alone is designated the Commander in Chief,124 and it is natural to believe that 
incident to this authority he must be able to conceal some military information. 
Perhaps, too, the power to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors125 implies an 
ancillary right to keep secrets. Finally, Article II’s Vesting Clause126—which, 
unlike its Article I counterpart,127 does not limit itself to powers “herein” 
enumerated—might imply a residuum of executive powers beyond those listed in 
the spare confines of the text. If the President can exercise certain powers not 
delineated in any particular clause, perhaps he can use this unnamed authority to do 
things that will not be named. 
ed, because the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers did not say all that much 
121. This point was not lost on the Framers. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 155-56 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that the debates surrounding the “from time to time” provision in the 
Statement and Account Clause “convey a very strong impression that the Framers . . . intended it 
to allow discretion to Congress and the President to preserve secrecy for expenditures related to 
military operations and foreign negotiations” (citation omitted)); JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S 
PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 52-53 (2007) (summarizing Elbridge Gerry’s, Patrick Henry’s, and 
George Mason’s criticisms of the “from time to time” provision in the Journal Clause). The 
Journal Clause in the Articles of Confederation contained a similarly worded secrecy exception 
but required monthly publication. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 7; CHAFETZ, supra, at 
52. 
122. For an oft-quoted statement of this traditional view, see Potter Stewart, “Or of the 
Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (“The public’s interest in knowing about its 
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The 
Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”). 
123. See Letter from David J. Barron, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., et al., to Harry Reid, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. 2 (Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Scholars’ War Powers Letter], 
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/features/pdf/congress_power_letter.pdf (cataloguing the 
“extensive powers relating to war” expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress). 
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
125. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
126. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
127. Id. art. I, § 1. 
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ighing against the 
prac
, we have a general historical understanding that the Framers were 
stro
 
about government secrecy, and what they did say was rarely tied to a specific 
constitutional provision. Originalist analysis must therefore be conducted at a level 
of generality that some scholars would discount or reject. Even if our predecessors 
had spoken more clearly, the amount of information created and controlled by 
modern government is so many orders of magnitude beyond what eighteenth-
century Americans had experienced that we might hesitate before relying on their 
views on the subject. Those caveats to the side, there are two basic historical 
arguments against government secrecy, and several in its favor.  
First, we have specific remarks by Founding Fathers inve
tice. Hardly a law review article on state secrecy goes by without mentioning 
the most provocative of the bunch, James Madison’s aphorism that “[a] popular 
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”128 Counterpoised against 
these remarks, however, are equally pointed statements in defense of government 
secrecy, particularly executive branch secrecy, proffered by equally esteemed 
Framers. Hardly a law review article on the unitary executive theory goes by 
without referencing Alexander Hamilton’s or John Jay’s tributes to the “secrecy 
and despatch” that only the executive branch can provide.129 We have no explicit 
evidence from the drafting or ratifying conventions to suggest that executive 
privilege was a commonly recognized attribute of the “executive power” at the time 
of the Founding.130 But neither do we have explicit evidence to suggest that the 
Framers and ratifiers understood the Constitution to create an enforceable “right to 
know.”131 
Second
ngly motivated by a desire to avert government tyranny and by a concomitant 
desire to achieve popular sovereignty.132 Inasmuch as official secrecy seems 
128. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAME
 ed., 1961) 
(high
akash, supra note 101, at 1173-85. 
ight to Know in Eighteenth-Century America 4 
(Aug
 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961
S MADISON, 1819-1836, at 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also supra note 97 and 
accompanying text (quoting James Wilson’s argument against congressional secrecy). 
129.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
lighting the President’s superior ability to provide “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and 
despatch” in general); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 393 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(highlighting the President’s superior ability to provide “secrecy and despatch” in the negotiation 
of treaties) . 
130. Pr
131. Jeffery A. Smith, Recognition of a R
. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“[L]aw journal articles, textbooks, 
and other writings have concluded that the concept of a right to know was scarcely recognized, if 
at all, in the founding era.” (internal citations omitted)). 
132. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313-14
) (“[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the 
constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is 
derived . . . .”). See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5-53 
(2005) (identifying popular sovereignty as the animating value of the original Constitution, as 
reflected in the Preamble’s invocation of “We the People”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTION 28-33, 86-90 (2008) (identifying popular sovereignty as one of the “bedrock” 
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anathema to these ideals, we might draw on the revolutionary spirit and etiology of 
our Constitution to deny its legitimacy. If the original Constitution failed to 
recognize or achieve these ideals, the subsequent addition of the First Amendment 
might also suggest a pro-openness trajectory, inflecting the preceding text and 
history with a deeper commitment to the values associated with free speech.133 
Counterpoised against these historical arguments, however, is the equally basic 
proposition that in drafting the Constitution, the Framers aimed to fix the central 
defect of the Articles of Confederation: the central government they created was 
too weak.134 Secrecy used in the service of preserving the union, or more generally 
in the service of advancing the common interests of “We the People,” seems 
facially consistent with this foundational goal. Furthermore, it is an awkward 
historical reality for open-government advocates that the Constitution itself was 
drafted in strict secrecy.135 Most scholars agree that the inaccessibility of the 
Philadelphia debates tends to negate whatever interpretive weight we might 
otherwise have assigned to their contents. Wholly apart from their substance, 
however, the conduct of the debates can serve as evidence that the Founding 
Fathers appreciated the benefits of secrecy in the predecisional stages of 
policymaking. 
So did their successors. Although each branch of government has tended to 
become more open over time, the United States has a long and pervasive history of 
executive branch secrecy in matters relating to internal deliberations and military 
strategy.136 Every President has kept such secrets. Congress and the courts have 
largely acquiesced. Notwithstanding the recent achievements of the open-
government movement, the executive branch has emphatically not worked itself 
pure of this habit. For those who would derive meaning from nonjudicial 
precedents, from the Constitution outside of the four corners of the text and outside 
of the courts, this is strong evidence that some significant amount of executive 
branch secrecy is at least tolerable. Even if one believes that our postratification 
traditions of secrecy are not constitutionally self-legitimating, or that they provide 
no epistemic insight into the meaning of the Constitution, they might at least 
suggest that it is not incompatible with our national ethos for the government to 
conceal many things. 
 
constitutional principles recognized “by nearly everyone as binding elements of our nation’s 
supreme law”). 
133. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) 
(asserting that, in cases of conflict with the “general powers” granted to the government in the 
body of the Constitution, the relatively “specific and emphatic guarantees” added by the First 
Amendment should prevail per standard inferences of construction).  
134. AMAR, supra note 132, at 28-53, 132, 301; MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2-12 (1913). 
135. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 FARRAND, supra note 97, at xi-xxv.  
136. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 156-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980); MOYNIHAN COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 40, at app. A; ROZELL, supra note 70, at 28-43, 54-155; Henkin, supra note 
91, at 273-76. 
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c. Structure 
I noted above that the strongest textual arguments for a right to know might be 
better classified as structural arguments.137 As a corollary of the right of Congress 
to exercise its legislative powers and the right of “We the People” to speak, publish, 
and petition freely, to choose leaders by elections, and to live under a republican 
form of government, it is plausible that officials must disclose information about 
their activities. If officials do not do so, they risk subverting the Constitution’s 
unifying aim to create a government of laws that would also be controlled by and 
responsive to the people. These are structural arguments, as well as textual 
arguments, in that they look not only to specific clauses in the Constitution but also 
to the relationships it establishes between the branches of government and between 
government and the people.138 In many ways, they echo the liberal democratic 
arguments for transparency explored in the previous Subpart—which is 
unsurprising given that the Constitution was designed, in part, to safeguard basic 
liberal democratic guarantees. 
We can take these structural insights further. The quintessential structural 
feature of the Constitution, the distribution of powers across the coordinate 
branches, serves as an information-forcing device. To fulfill its responsibilities, 
each branch is required both to give and receive information from the others. 
Congress must publish laws if it wants the other branches to understand and 
enforce them, and, like the executive, it must submit documents and arguments to 
the courts if it wants to participate in judicial proceedings. Congress, in turn, must 
learn from the executive and the judiciary how its laws are being applied, and how 
the other branches are functioning generally, if it wants to legislate intelligently. 
Judges must look to the other branches for positive sources of law, and must issue 
public decisions if they want their interpretations to guide their “political” 
colleagues. The President must persuade Congress if he wants to change statutes, 
receive funding, or reorganize his offices. And, of course, Congress and the 
President are required to collaborate to enact legislation, ratify treaties, and confirm 
nominations. The “public and dialogic nature” of these foundational government 
processes, Heidi Kitrosser has argued, provides significant evidence for a 
constitutional norm of publicity and visibility.139  
It may be of special significance to the structuralist that Congress—the branch 
137. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
138. The classic statement of the structural method of constitutional interpretation is 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). In its 
attention to the overarching themes, aspirations, and design of our constitutional order, 
structuralism could be seen as a kind of high purposivism or “macroscopic prudentialism.” 
BOBBITT, supra note 94, at 74. For a provocative new critique of structural analyses that fail to 
ground their claims in specific constitutional text, see John F. Manning, Federalism and the 
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). I take it that 
Manning would reject some of the interpretive moves made in this Part for operating at too high a 
level of generality. 
139. Kitrosser, supra note 31, at 518-20.  
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of government least equipped to keep secrets on account of its numerosity, multi-
partisanship, and the nature of its authority—is the only branch given an express 
grant to do so.140 Meanwhile, the branch that generates and controls the most 
sensitive information, the executive, is entirely dependent on Congress for the 
funds to do much of anything with that information. In all of these ways, the 
multilayered interdependence that characterizes the branches’ relations appears to 
contemplate a regular flow of information so that each can try to influence, and 
modulate its activities in light of, what the others are doing. 
Yet, if certain structural features of the Constitution suggest an expectation of 
government openness, other features appear to anticipate the use of secrecy. First, 
the information-forcing potential of the separation of powers does not necessarily 
yield any broader publicity principle. To the contrary, the creation of such a self-
regulating system might carry a negative implication against deriving “rights to 
know” beyond what the ebb and flow of the political process will provide of its 
own momentum. Second, there is the special role of the executive branch. The 
paradigmatic areas in which secrecy can have strategic value are in the conduct of 
international negotiations and of military affairs. Primary authority in both fields is 
given to the branch that has a unitary administrator, representing all of the people, 
and that has the greatest procedural freedom. (Secondary authority in treatymaking, 
moreover, is given to the less numerous chamber of Congress, the Senate.)141 The 
branch that is best equipped institutionally to keep secrets is thus assigned the 
government functions that tend to require secrecy most. This hardly looks like 
coincidence. The design of the Constitution points to the executive branch as a 
privileged domain of clandestine action. 
Whereas the structural arguments in favor of government transparency focus 
on the checks and balances that bind the branches to each other and to the people, 
this argument focuses on “the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned 
area of constitutional duties.”142 As Akhil Amar has observed, a dose of practical 
wisdom lies at the “nub” of this insight: 
The Presidency is the only branch structured to be permanently in session, 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Also, it is the only branch whose 
power resides in a single, unitary figure. The evident constitutional design 
here is thus to enable one part of the government to act quickly and decisively, 
with unity, energy, vigor, dispatch, and, if need be, secrecy. When an 
insurrection breaks out or an invasion occurs or a foreign policy crisis erupts, 
Congress may not even be in session, and unless the President acts unilaterally 
140. Aziz Huq, Hold on There, Mr. President: It’s Time to Put a Limit on Executive 
Privilege, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 29, 2007, at B2; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying 
text (discussing structural constraints on congressional secrecy). 
141. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936) (quoting 
George Washington for the insight that excluding the House helps preserve secrecy in 
treatymaking); cf. supra Part II.A (explaining connections between numerosity and publicity). 
142. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). 
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to preserve the status quo ante, Congress may never again be able to act.143 
In this argument, as in so many compelling constitutional arguments, text 
meets history meets structure. Textual clues such as the discrepancy in the Article I 
and II vesting clauses, historical clues such as the Framers’ concern to strengthen 
the central government and to enable unilateral action in times of emergency, and 
structural clues such as the allocation of treaty- and war-making powers to the body 
in government best able to keep secrets, converge to suggest a constitutional 
principle authorizing occasional executive branch secrecy. The scope and contours 
of that power are hazy, to be sure, and the mechanisms of judicial review and 
congressional oversight provide critical checks. But the principle can be glimpsed. 
d. Prudence 
The prudential arguments for and against government secrecy should be easier 
to grasp at this point, because they echo the consequentialist arguments elaborated 
above in Subpart A.144 Against secrecy, we have the standard menu of claims 
about how it may lead to abuse, corruption, and inferior decision making. In favor 
of secrecy, we have the standard claims about its strategic and efficiency value.145 
Are these constitutional considerations? At least in a few circumstances, many 
would answer this question in the affirmative. When Justice Jackson famously 
quipped that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact,”146 he was making not so 
much a descriptive or historical claim as a prudential argument about the meaning 
of the document: that no matter where the other interpretive modalities might lead, 
the Constitution need not tolerate legal outcomes that threaten the very existence of 
the nation; that constitutional rights “should not be interpreted to be self-
defeating.”147 An argument that state secrecy is vital to national security is, by this 
reckoning, an argument that the Constitution does not forbid such secrecy, and may 
143. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997, 2005 (2006). 
144. Philip Bobbitt describes prudentialism as “constitutional argument which is actuated 
by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the decision.” BOBBITT, supra note 94, 
at 61. This approach has clear affinities with, and in some formulations may be identical to, what 
others would term pragmatism. 
145. There are also the standard arguments about institutional competence and the role of 
the courts that might lead a judge to decline to resolve a particular information-access dispute. 
These arguments are prudential too, but they do not provide any substantive basis for evaluating 
the constitutionality of the underlying secrecy. 
146. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 17 (1991) (observing that prudential arguments are 
“likeliest to be decisive” in emergency situations). The other touchstone here is Abraham 
Lincoln’s “all the laws, but one” line. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session 
(July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953) (“[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”). 
147. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 247 (2001). 
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even require it. An argument that secrecy impairs national security carries the 
opposite imp
Other formulations of prudentialism sweep broader. Justice Breyer likes to say 
that the Framers intended the Constitution to be a “workable” document, creating a 
government that would serve the nation well throughout the centuries to come.148 
This suggests that practices may be constitutionally unsound not only if they 
threaten the very existence of the country but also if they threaten more mundane 
administrative values, such as efficiency and reliability, or if they threaten values 
such as personal liberty that are especially important in the American cultural ethos 
(here, prudential analysis may verge into ethical or moral analysis). If secrecy truly 
is indispensable to the quality of deliberative processes or the effectiveness of 
government, then perhaps federal officials can claim a constitutional right to use 
it.149 If, to the contrary, secrecy is more likely to undermine these values, its 
prudential basis falls away. 
e. Doctrine  
Lastly, let us consider what the federal courts have said about secrecy as a 
doctrinal matter. For many years, they did not say much—an indication of the low 
constitutional salience of the issue. It was not until the 1970s that open-government 
advocates began to make a concerted push for judicial recognition of public access 
claims, and it was not until the 1980s that they achieved some limited success. Two 
lines of doctrine are key.  
First, in a series of cases involving challenges to closed judicial proceedings, 
the Supreme Court has established some basic access rights, rooted in the First 
Amendment, and laid a platform for possible further moves. After speaking 
dismissively of the idea of a constitutional right to know in cases such as Pell v. 
Procunier150 and Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,151 the Court made what appeared to be 
a decisive shift in the opposite direction in the Richmond Newspapers case, holding 
that the public and the press have a presumptive right under the First Amendment 
to attend criminal trials.152 Applying Justice Brennan’s hybrid historical/pragmatic 
148. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1392 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(invoking “the workable Constitution that the Founders envisaged”); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 34 (2005) (“In sum, our constitutional 
history has been a quest for workable government, workable democratic government, workable 
democratic government protective of individual personal liberty.”). Other Justices have similarly 
invoked workability as a constitutional norm. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
149. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“Nowhere in the Constitution 
. . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest 
relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.”). 
150. 417 U.S. 817, 834 n.9 (1974). 
151. 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
152. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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test,153 the Court progressively extended that right in several subsequent 
decisions.154 But the case law has dried up. The Court has not issued a significant 
information-access decision in over two decades now, and lower courts have gone 
different ways.155 The legacy of Richmond Newspapers remains up for grabs. 
Second, in a longer line of cases, dating back to the 1800s, the Supreme Court 
has affirmed the power of Congress to investigate the executive branch. The Court 
has established some modest limits on this oversight power: namely, that it must 
have a legitimate legislative purpose, it must abide by constitutional restraints on 
government action, and it must not trespass “into matters which are within the 
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government.”156 Yet, 
against whatever separation-of-powers problems such interbranch oversight might 
risk, the Court has repeatedly made clear that Congress’s power of inquiry is “as 
penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under 
the Constitution.”157 
In a variety of contexts, however, the Supreme Court has also made clear that 
government secrecy, particularly executive branch secrecy in the service of national 
defense, will be tolerated to a significant degree. United States v. Nixon recognized 
a constitutionally based presidential privilege, grounded in the separation of powers 
and the prudential need for candor, to withhold information from judicial 
process.158 United States v. Reynolds recognized a common-law state secrets 
privilege to prevent materials from being disclosed in civil litigation.159 Cases such 
as Department of the Navy v. Egan,160 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp.,161 and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.162 
contain strong language on the President’s preeminence in international affairs and 
his authority, grounded in the Commander-in-Chief Clause, to classify and control 
153. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (urging courts to ask whether the government 
process in question has “a tradition of accessibility” and whether public access “is important in 
terms of that very process”); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-13 
(1986) (conducting this two-part inquiry); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
605-06 (1982) (same); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: 
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 108-
25 (2004) (explaining that courts have generally taken Justice Brennan’s test to be the controlling 
standard for resolving access claims).  
154. See Kitrosser, supra note 153, at 97-99, 103-12, 116-25. 
155. Lower courts have split, for example, on whether and to what extent to recognize 
public access rights in administrative proceedings. See id. at 118-25.  
156. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); accord McGrain v. Daugherty, 
273 U.S. 135, 170-75 (1927). See generally William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s 
Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 788-803 (summarizing the 
doctrine). 
157. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111. 
158. 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974). 
159. 345 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1953). 
160. 484 U.S. 518, 527-30 (1988). 
161. 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
162. 299 U.S. 304, 315-29 (1936). 
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information bearing on national security. And, of course, the Court has declined 
many invitations to expand the holdings of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny 
into a broader principle of public access to government information. 
Outside of the constitutional context, courts have also been extremely 
deferential in their review of Freedom of Information Act record denials, virtually 
rubber-stamping them when the government invokes the Act’s national security 
exemption.163 Courts routinely emphasize their limited institutional competence 
and the potential costs of mandating disclosure in the face of executive branch 
claims that doing so would cause public harm. 
This cursory sketch is enough to show that if our case law reflects cautious 
support for a publicly held right to know what the government is up to, and more 
robust support for a congressional and judicial right to see relevant documents the 
executive branch has produced, it also reflects a deep skepticism of judicial 
intervention in this area. Courts have never passed judgment on most pieces of our 
immense government secrecy system. 
2. Deep secrecy and the Constitution 
To sum up the analysis above: state secrecy’s role in the Constitution is 
ambiguous. If there is a generalized “right to know,” it cannot be a right for 
everyone to know everything at all times, and it may be trumped by other rights or 
responsibilities vested in a particular branch of government. Courts and 
commentators have taken an ad hoc approach to discerning when information-
access rights should prevail; little attention has been paid to the character of the 
secrecy at issue, as opposed to its (putative) content or the character of the 
competing interests in disclosure versus nondisclosure. Does the Constitution 
suggest any overarching principles, any overarching themes, about which forms of 
secrecy may or may not be used?  
I will argue in this Subpart that one such principle, perhaps the only such 
principle, is a strong presumption that deep secrecy is illegitimate. If the document 
and the doctrine yield only tentative answers when it comes to government 
openness generally, they permit a powerful argument against deep secrecy 
specifically. 
It may be helpful to take stock of the universe of factual situations we are 
dealing with. In many information-access disputes, the government has restricted 
public access to something: a trial, a hearing, a prison, a foreign visa. These are 
important domains of secrecy, but they are not likely to involve very deep secrecy. 
If members of the public are able to identify the government privilege or 
proceeding to which they seek access, they have already crossed over the basic 
threshold of depth. They know something about what they do not know; their 
curiosity has been piqued; that is why they seek greater access. Deep secrecy might 
163. See Fuchs, supra note 57, at 163-67; Samaha, supra note 51, at 939-40; Pozen, supra 
note 11, at 637-38.  
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still be lurking, as information might emerge from the courtroom deposition, the 
administrative hearing, the prison interview, or the foreign country that was not 
anticipated. But deep secrecy is generally more likely to occur in backrooms and 
back channels, in government discussions and decisions that take place outside of 
any formal, regularized, quasi-public structure. Compared to generic assertions of a 
“right to know,” the claim that deep secrecy offends the Constitution is therefore 
more modest in scope (in that deep secrets constitute an extreme subset of all state 
secrets), yet perhaps more ambitious to operationalize (in that access to these 
secrets cannot typically be granted simply by opening up a preexisting process). 
a. Text 
A textual analysis of deep secrecy can add a few wrinkles to the textual 
analysis of secrecy generally. Let us return to the Constitution’s only reference to 
“secrecy,” in the Journal Clause.164 While the clause leaves great flexibility to the 
houses of Congress “in respect to the particular mode in which, or with what 
fullness, shall be kept the[ir] proceedings,”165 the secrecy it authorizes is limited in 
several important ways. First, the clause places the obligation to keep a journal onto 
“[e]ach House.” As with the affirmative powers granted to “each House” in Article 
I, Section 5,166 this phrasing suggests that the obligation is a collective one, shared 
by all members of the chamber and not just, say, the leadership of the majority 
party. Second, although the clause does not specify what counts as “proceedings,” 
it speaks in categorical terms about the duty to keep a journal that records them. It 
is only at the publication stage when secrecy and stalling may enter. Finally, the 
clause’s roll call provision (“the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on 
any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the 
Journal”) sets an exceptionally low threshold for requiring the journal to reflect the 
precise content of congressional votes, which “empower[s] minorities to force 
public accountability and transparency on the majority.”167 Nowhere else in the 
Constitution do we find a precise submajority voting rule of any kind.168 
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Journal Clause). 
165. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892). 
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (power to judge qualifications of members and to do 
business); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (power to determine rules and to punish members).  
167. Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. 
POL. PHIL. 74, 79 (2005) (emphasis omitted). Adrian Vermeule provides incisive analyses of the 
Journal Clause in id. at 84-86, and Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional 
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410-22 (2004). 
168. I say precise because “a smaller Number [than a majority of Members] may adjourn 
from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Of course, every supermajority voting rule could be reconceptualized as a 
submajority voting rule, and vice versa, if one simply inverts the object of the vote. (If it takes 
“two thirds of the Senators present” to ratify a treaty, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, then it takes one-third to 
defeat a treaty.) But it is still notable that the Constitution expressly sets a submajority threshold 
only once, in the Journal Clause. 
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These three features of the Journal Clause—that a journal must be kept, that it 
may be excised only pursuant to a collective process, and that it must record 
individual members’ votes if one-fifth of those present so desire—serve as a 
structural safeguard against depth. They make it much more difficult for 
congressional leaders to pursue a course of action that is not meant to be found out. 
Even if there is a time lag before the journal is published, and even if some portions 
will never be published, the journal’s content will, at a minimum, be accessible to a 
large number of representatives from divergent backgrounds, constituencies, and 
political parties. To the extent that the Journal Clause yields any broader insight 
into the forms of government secrecy that are constitutionally permissible, it could 
be taken to suggest that secrets will be less offensive when the decision to conceal 
them is made pursuant to a clear and demanding procedure that incorporates robust 
political checks. 
A stronger textual (and structural) argument against deep secrecy can be 
gleaned from the First Amendment. Proponents of a constitutional “right to know,” 
such as Thomas Emerson, have sought to derive from the First Amendment an all-
encompassing right to learn what the government is up to.169 One difficulty with 
this thesis lies in its undiscriminating notion of what the First Amendment’s 
guarantees require to be meaningful. In theory and reality, speech is not degraded 
equally by all forms of state concealment. A more modest version of Emerson’s 
thesis would focus on deep secrecy specifically. Whatever other access rights it 
provides, we might say, the First Amendment at least secures a right to learn the 
basic contours of what the government is up to.  
So long as the press is aware that officials are keeping certain types of secrets, 
public discourse can still flourish. One subject people can debate is whether the 
secrecy system is a good system, or whether more openness ought to be provided. 
Journalists can try to ferret out embarrassing or disturbing facts. Politicians can be 
rewarded or punished for their positions on these matters; citizens can check their 
guardians on the very issue of their commitment to being checked.170 None of this 
is possible to any comparable degree with deep secrets. Deep secrets deprive 
information-outsiders of even the crudest means of comprehension and so frustrate 
public discourse at a more fundamental level.  
The philosophical lesson here is that, while the rights to speak freely, to 
petition the government, and to choose leaders through popular elections are 
always impaired by state secrecy, these processes only become a “farce”171 in the 
face of consummated deep secrecy.172 Advocates of a right to know might do well 
169. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text. 
170. As I write these lines, all of these things appear to be happening in response to 
President Obama’s decision to withhold certain photographs of United States military personnel 
abusing detainees. See Jeff Zeleny & Thom Shanker, Obama Reversal on Abuse Photos, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A1. 
171. Supra text accompanying note 128 (quoting James Madison).  
172. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (distinguishing consummated from 
deliberative deep state secrets). 
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to acknowledge that official acts of concealment do not threaten First Amendment 
values in a uniform way—that even when we do not know the contents of withheld 
information, we can still take a measure of comfort, and dollop out a measure of 
criticism, if the secret is shallow. There is a practical lesson here, too, as judges 
may find it easier to cabin and enforce an otherwise limitless right to know if they 
reason from this principle.173 To agree on these points, we need not agree whether 
the central purpose of the First Amendment is “to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,”174 “to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs,”175 “to foreclose public authority from 
assuming a guardianship of the public mind,”176 to “foster[] individual self-
expression,”177 or any other plausible alternative. Deep secrecy poses a unique 
threat to all of these. 
With consummated deep secrets, another piece of the Bill of Rights becomes 
potentially relevant: the Fourth Amendment.178 The Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” clearly does not prohibit all 
search- and seizure-related secrecy. Government officials can obtain a warrant 
without first informing the target, or do preparatory investigative work to see if an 
arrest is needed, and no one would think this unreasonable. But the Amendment’s 
warrant requirement subjects that secrecy to certain constraints. The authorities 
who desire a warrant must go to a different set of authorities, describe with some 
particularity what they are looking for and why, and receive prior approval for their 
actions. 
Within the government, then, the warrant requirement ensures that 
investigative secrecy will be moved from deeper to shallower before the moment 
when the search or seizure actually takes place. The many judicially recognized 
exceptions to this rule—exigent circumstances, search incident to a lawful arrest, 
plain view, hot pursuit, border searches, vehicle searches, special needs searches, 
and so on179—do not necessarily undermine this safeguard. None of these 
exceptions allows the authorities to bypass the warrant requirement in a situation 
that is likely to have been preceded by deep investigative secrecy in the form of 
sustained government snooping or surveillance on an unwitting target. 
The point can be generalized if we understand the “right of the people to be 
173. Cf. Cheh, supra note 69, at 723 (asserting that the most “substantial claim raised 
against the right of access formulation is that courts lack a principled way to apply or confine it”).  
174. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
175. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
176. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
177. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
178. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
179. See generally Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 
39 (2008). 
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” to embody more than just a 
right to privacy or physical liberty. Jed Rubenfeld has recently argued in these 
pages that the Fourth Amendment’s central purpose is to guarantee a right to 
security, understood as the right to enjoy a personal life free from unjustified 
government violation, free from “a pervasive, cringing fear of the state.”180 On this 
view, the Fourth Amendment serves the structural function of ensuring that a 
constitutional system founded on popular sovereignty and individual liberty does 
not degenerate into totalitarianism.  
Consummated deep secrets offend this understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment. No matter what the laws might provide or the authorities might 
promise, there is no way for the individual to feel confident about his or her relation 
to the state if small cadres of officials may consistently manipulate the lived 
environment without any external checks. Deep secrecy threatens not only the rule 
of law but also the sense of personal security that comes with living in a society 
governed by the rule of law. 
Against these arguments, it is much harder to identify a contrary principle 
anywhere in the text of the Constitution. The fact that the Constitution’s guarantees 
of congressional and executive publicity are all moderated temporally does not 
provide it.181 The “from time to time” modifier acts as a pragmatic brake on 
potentially unwieldy duties of transparency; the secrecy it validates is interstitial, 
bounded. The best textual candidates for a deep secrecy power, rather, are Article 
II’s Commander-in-Chief Clause and its comparatively open-ended Vesting 
Clause. Only in these provisions can a government actor claim an express basis for 
using secrecy that does not come with a built-in limiting principle. 
Yet it would stretch this text quite far if the President were to claim the power 
not only to withhold the content of specific information in his control but also to 
deprive the other branches of the means to learn about, influence, or check that 
content. The obvious rebuttal is that Congress and the courts need to know what the 
executive branch is doing in order to fulfill their prescribed functions and to police 
constitutional violations. The more basic objection is that there is nothing about 
commander-in-chief or executive authority that implies such a prerogative, that the 
power to use deep secrecy may not “flow from the nature of [the President’s] 
enumerated powers.”182 In order to lead a military, administer a bureaucracy, and 
enforce the laws, it may well be necessary for the President to conceal information 
from some outside parties for some amount of time. It is much harder to see why he 
would need to keep deep secrets to discharge his formal duties, or why the capacity 
to do so inheres in a nonmonarchical office. To the contrary, the power to conceal 
the fact of one’s concealment might appear to conflict with the vision of the 
presidency intimated by the many constitutional provisions permitting Congress to 
control the means by which the President carries out his constitutional 
180. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 127 (2008). 
181. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
182. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). 
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responsibilities.183 
I will return soon to the limits on deep secrecy suggested by the separation of 
powers. Here, I am suggesting that while it is reasonable to think that, as a logical 
or functional incident of his enumerated powers, the President may keep many 
secrets, it does not likewise follow that he has the authority to keep them deep. 
b. History 
Americans of the Founding era did not, of course, explicitly attend to the 
deep/shallow distinction. The entire concept of depth would have been less salient 
in an age when the executive branch was so much smaller and more unitary, 
information technology so much more primitive, and the mass media so much 
more remote. Nevertheless, if we take the arguments voiced by the opponents of 
state secrecy—James Wilson’s assertion that “[t]he people have a right to know 
what their Agents are doing or have done,”184 Patrick Henry’s assertion that the 
“liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of 
their rulers may be concealed from them,”185 and so forth—it does not take much 
imagination to see how deep secrecy might be of special concern. I argued in the 
previous Subpart that deep secrets pose a distinct threat to liberal democratic values 
such as popular sovereignty and freedom from tyranny. These arguments may take 
on constitutional significance in light of the Framers’ professed goal to realize 
those values in the Constitution they were creating.  
We know that the Framers were also seeking a more powerful and efficacious 
central government, and that certain Framers emphasized the utility of secrecy 
toward this end. It is less clear whether this principle speaks to the deep/shallow 
distinction. Historians have observed that while we have strong statements from 
leading Framers on the need for occasional executive-branch secrecy, we have no 
statements suggesting this secrecy would or could be “absolute.”186 Furthermore, 
recent scholarship casts significant doubt on the notion that the Founding 
generation viewed the Constitution as vesting the President with any preclusive 
powers relating to warmaking, even in decisions on tactical details.187 And though 
183. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
185. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 
IN 1787, at 170 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (1836). 
186. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 34 
(1981). 
187. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 772-803 
(2008); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION: 
PRECEDENTS FROM THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION (2009), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/GW.2009.pdf (arguing that, contrary to recent 
executive branch claims, Washington-era precedents do not support the view the President was 
ever thought to have plenary and exclusive authority over national security information). 
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there may be times when deep secrecy is instrumentally valuable for officials, a 
central government can administer a bureaucracy, superintend the states, and 
defend against enemies without resorting to it in any systematic fashion. 
At a very crude level, then, an asymmetry exists between the central originalist 
arguments for and against deep secrecy. While the basic normative principles 
articulated by the Framers can be invoked with comparable force for and against 
state secrecy, they offer stronger support to the opponent of deep state secrecy. 
The secret drafting history of the Constitution cannot rebalance the scales. The 
content of the deliberations in Philadelphia may have been closely guarded, but it 
was well-known at the time that the Conventi on itself was occurring.188 Once the 
drafting process was concluded, the document’s contents were made public, its 
authors were identified, and its political fate was subjected to a ratification process 
unparalleled for the time in its levels of inclusiveness and democratic 
participation.189 All of which is to say that the secrecy used in creating the 
Constitution was shallow indeed.  
Looking to postratification history, the case for deep secrecy also suffers. 
While it is abundantly clear that the United States has a long and consistent 
tradition of executive branch secrecy, it is less clear that this tradition extends to 
deep secrecy. For one thing, it is uncertain, as an empirical matter, how often a 
small group of executive branch officials has intentionally and successfully 
concealed relevant information from the public and from the other branches, such 
that the outsiders’ ignorance precluded them from learning about, checking, or 
influencing the keepers’ use of the information. That is the nature of deep secrecy. 
We all know the President classifies thousands of documents. We have no clue 
how often he does things about which we have no clue. 
However much Presidents have in fact utilized deep secrets, the decisive 
constitutional point is this: we do not have any significant public tradition of their 
usage, or of congressional, judicial, and popular acceptance thereof.190 The 
interpretive force of a nonjudicial precedent depends in part on there having been 
meaningful contemporaneous consent to the practice, which generates pragmatic, 
epistemic, and democratic reasons to give the precedent weight. At the least, the 
188. See generally FARRAND, supra note 134, at 9-41 (discussing public acts and debates 
leading to the Convention). 
189. AMAR, supra note 132, at 7, 17-18. 
190. We do have a recent tradition of explicit congressional acquiescence in certain 
national-security-related secrets, such as “waived” programs and covert actions, that the President 
discloses only to a very select group from Congress, such as the “Gang of Eight.” See infra Part 
IV.B. Exactly how to characterize the depth of these secrets is a debatable question, and the 
answer may vary from case to case. When the vast majority of Congress (along with the general 
public) is clueless about a secret and the Gang of Eight lacks a meaningful ability to challenge it, 
the secret is best understood as deep. When many members of Congress understand the gist of a 
secret and the Gang of Eight can effectively represent their interests, the secret becomes 
significantly shallower. Both types of secrets raise constitutional concerns to the extent that the 
full legislative body is deprived pertinent information, but in the former case the concerns are 
much more acute. 
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precedent must be easily discoverable to ensure against self-interested or bizarre 
interpretations.191 But meaningful consent never exists with deep secrets. On 
account of their insularity, deep secrets never achieve robust support, even within 
government. And any discoverability that arises will be idiosyncratic and belated. It 
would be perverse to maintain that, in virtue of doing things that no one else knows 
about, the executive branch has established a precedential basis for the 
constitutionality of doing things that no one else knows about. 
I suspect, moreover, that certain types of deep state secrets—those that never 
emerge or that emerge only many years later—will conflict with our constitutional 
ethos, with our sense of “who we are as a people.”192 Americans are unaccustomed 
to thinking of the United States as a country in which the government can operate 
beyond all public comprehension. Irrespective of their content, long-standing deep 
secrets may subvert our ethical commitment to understanding and learning from, 
rather than burying, our collective history. 
If America’s postratification history cannot be invoked to legitimate a 
constitutional norm of deep secrecy, can it be invoked for the contrary purpose? 
My tentative answer is yes. I have already alluded to the dramatic shift in cultural 
sentiment toward state secrecy that occurred in the 1970s. In that decade, Congress 
passed two framework laws on government openness, the 1974 Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) amendments193 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA),194 as well as the Presidential Records Act195 and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act.196 For those who subscribe to any form of living 
constitutionalism, this shift alone might caution against reading too much into 
experiences of secrecy that came before, as the constitutional understandings 
reflected in those precedents may have lost their fou
Yet the open-government movement, and the legislation it produced, has not 
targeted all forms of secrecy equally. FISA and FOIA both contemplate significant 
concealment. Pursuant to FISA, the executive may still conduct covert foreign 
intelligence surveillance. Pursuant to FOIA, the executive may still decline to turn 
over whole categories of records. What especially offends these laws is not 
government secrecy, nor even massive government secrecy; it is deep secrecy. In 
the case of FISA, this is true because the statute requires intelligence officials to 
191. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 718-35 
(2008); Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the 
NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1067-68 (2008). 
192. Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated Rights Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
209, 220 n.53 (2006) (invoking Bobbitt’s ethical argument). 
193. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
194. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2006)). 
195. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2006)). 
196. Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1-16 (2006)). 
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receive a warrant from a special Article III court before commencing surveillance 
on United States persons.197 The central feature of FISA, and its central advance 
over prior practice, is that it subjects the executive’s secret plans to ex ante approval 
by a separate and nonaligned group of officials—the classic means of moderating 
depth within government while preserving the advantages of opacity beyond. FISA 
represents a decisive repudiation of the deep-secret surveillance practices of earlier 
administrations. 
The case of FOIA is a little more complex. FOIA appears on paper to be a 
remarkably, even radically, potent tool for transparency. It allows virtually anyone 
to request any government record, for any reason, in any accessible format, with the 
burden on the agency to justify withholdings.198 It requires documents to be 
furnished at no charge or reduced charge whenever “in the public interest.”199 
Many have complained that, as it has been applied by agencies and courts, the 
statute’s exemptions have sometimes seemed to overwhelm its access 
guarantees.200 Deep secrecy poses a more fundamental problem: for a FOIA 
request to generate responsive documents, the requester must have enough a priori 
information to be able to describe what it is she is seeking.201 If the government 
keeps people ignorant of their own ignorance on certain matters, no one will be 
able to frame requests concerning those matters. The public will lack the necessary 
“prerequisite knowledge.”202 
Deep secrecy does not formally threaten FOIA as it does FISA. An 
administration could keep the public in total darkness about many things but 
nevertheless comply with the Act. Deep secrecy functionally and purposively 
threatens FOIA. It defeats the Act’s guarantees even before the point when an 
agency claims a nondisclosure exemption, which provides public notice that 
something is being concealed and, more important, exposes the underlying records 
to potential judicial scrutiny. An administration that favored deep secrets yet 
punctiliously complied with record requests would not be honoring the spirit of the 
Act and its “general philosophy of full agency disclosure.”203 
197. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2006). 
198. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring agencies to make non-exempt records 
“promptly available to any person” upon appropriate request); id. § 552(a)(3)(B) (requiring 
agencies to make records available in “any form or format requested” that is “readily 
reproducible”); id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (authorizing de novo review of complaints in federal court, with 
“the burden . . . on the agency to sustain its action”). 
199. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). 
200. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 57, at 163-67; Samaha, supra note 51, at 937-41, 971-74. 
201. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring that requesters “reasonably describe[]” the 
records they seek). For a FOIA request to succeed, the agency must also comply in good faith and 
not, for example, destroy documents. 
202. Kreimer, supra note 74, at 1025-32 (observing that FOIA record requests demand 
precise framing and “prerequisite knowledge” to yield useful results). 
203. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). Courts have incorporated a space for deep secrecy 
within the FOIA process by allowing agencies to submit “Glomar” responses, which “neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records.” Phillipi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 
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FISA and FOIA are not regular statutes. They were developed in response to 
dramatic government abuses. They grew out of widespread social movements. 
They took years to craft. They were passed with overwhelming support. Their 
enactment entrenched a dramatic normative shift in Americans’ expectations of 
government. Their proponents made their case in explicit constitutional terms; so 
did their opponents. FISA and FOIA are the closest thing we have to a 
constitutional amendment on state secrecy.204 As mere pieces of legislation, they 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Glomar responses may be necessary in some extreme cases. They threaten to 
undermine the text and purpose of the Act when a court relies solely on the agency’s 
representations and does not determine for itself whether the underlying documents are properly 
classified or whether any portion can be reasonably segregated and disclosed. It is not so much the 
public ignorance that Glomar responses maintain as the judicial abdication they invite that is 
inconsistent with FOIA. Even an uncritical acceptance of a Glomar response, however, provides 
some notice to the public and to Congress that an issue may warrant further investigation—setting 
the stage for the secret to become shallower over time. 
204. On the history and significance of FOIA, see, for example, National Archives & 
Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (stating that FOIA facilitates “a 
structural necessity in a real democracy”); Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 16 (2001) (“In FOIA, after all, a new conception of Government 
conduct was enacted into law, ‘a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” (quoting Dep’t of 
Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989))); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190-95 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (explaining the origins and effects of FOIA’s foundational 1974 amendments); 
ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 14-17 (discussing FOIA’s global influence); Daniel J. Solove, Access 
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 
(2002) (noting that all fifty states now have open-records statutes, most of them modeled on the 
federal FOIA). On FISA, see for example, 154 CONG. REC. S15734-37 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter Kennedy FISA Speech] (extolling the history of FISA 
and asserting that “[i]n our ‘information age,’ . . . FISA provides Americans a fundamental 
bulwark against Government tyranny and abuse”); William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1216-33 (2007) (tracing the origins of FISA); Rubenfeld, supra note 180, at 
157-60 (defending FISA’s critical role in safeguarding Fourth Amendment values). 
 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have popularized the term “super-statute” to describe a 
law or series of laws that: 
(1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over 
time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or 
normative principles have a broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four 
corners of the statute. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001). This 
is not the place to develop the argument, but FOIA and (more debatably) FISA could easily be 
said to meet these conditions. Passed in its modern form after the Watergate scandal and the 
Vietnam War, FOIA introduced a norm of open access to government documents that has 
commanded deep public loyalty, taken on a quasi-constitutional valence, and spawned a vast 
network of imitator laws at all levels of United States government and in democracies around the 
world. FOIA is such a good example of a super-statute that it is surprising no one has assigned it 
the label yet.  
FISA has not influenced public culture to the same extent—which is to be expected 
given that, unlike with FOIA, members of the public have no direct role to play in the 
statute’s operation. But at least until the George W. Bush administration, every President, 
Congress, and court had accepted FISA, see Rubenfeld, supra note 180, at 159, and the 
statute is widely seen as having established norms of privacy, legality, and interbranch 
cooperation that transcend its specific context. The belief that FISA represents something 
greater than a typical law helps explain why the Bush administration’s noncompliance 
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have no place among the orthodox materials of constitutional interpretation. But the 
idea that they might nonetheless reflect or consolidate a constitutional norm has 
become increasingly familiar.205 Originalism is largely silent on the deep/shallow 
distinction. Our constitutional practices, as embodied in our framework open-
government statutes, have moved markedly away from deep secrecy. 
c. Structure  
The deep/shallow distinction may be relevant to the structuralist on several 
levels. The basic arguments should by now be apparent, and I will not belabor 
them. First, above and beyond the language of any particular clause, deep secrecy 
can impair foundational values the Constitution was designed to protect at a 
systemic level. The previous Subpart explained that, as compared to shallow 
secrets, deep secrets pose a qualitatively greater threat to a cluster of liberal 
democratic values—personal liberty, accountable government, rule of law—both 
by exacerbating the standard problems of state secrecy and by introducing new 
threats to autonomy, legality, and representation.206 Inasmuch as deep secrecy 
poses a special threat to these values, and inasmuch as these values are integral to 
the meaningful realization of republican self-government, its usage poses a threat to 
the structure of our constitutional system.  
Second, and more concretely, deep secrecy threatens the relationships among 
the coordinate branches. If the executive branch conceals the existence of a 
program it is running, Congress will have no ability to fulfill its legislative, 
oversight, or appropriations duties related to the program. Judges will not be able to 
adjudicate cases or controversies that might have arisen. All of the democratic and 
legal checks built into our branch structure, it turns out, depend on each branch 
being aware of what the others are doing. Deep secrecy threatens this sufficiency 
condition by allowing executive aggrandizement to occur not just unchecked but 
unnoticed. 
To put the point a little more colorfully, we might say that there is a principle 
to be derived from the Constitution that forbids the existence of “black holes” in 
government: activities taken by one branch that the others have no means of 
provoked such intense public anguish. See, e.g., Kennedy FISA Speech, supra; Bob Herbert, 
Who Will Stand Up for the Constitution?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at A23. 
205. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 204, at 1275 (asserting that “[t]here is, and 
long has been, an intermediate category [between ordinary and higher law] of fundamental or 
quasi-constitutional law” and that “super-statutes” have served this function since the twentieth 
century); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 31-35 (2004) (similar for “foundational statutes”); Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 passim (2007) (similar for 
“landmark statutes”); Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and 
Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 481-92 (1976) (similar for 
“framework legislation”). 
206. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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learning about.207 If there is an inherent constitutional problem with, say, the CIA 
running a program or a court issuing a judgment about which outsiders suspect 
nothing, I believe it is a structural one. No one can observe or oppose these deep 
secret-keepers. Their acts reflect a more extreme form of unilateralism than the 
belief that a certain branch has exclusive power to act in an area; they reflect the 
belief that this branch also need not tell anyone it has gone ahead and done so. The 
substantive prerogatives of the other branches may lie within the event horizon of 
such black holes.208 An executive power to run a program in deep secrecy, for 
example, could eventually swallow Congress’s power to fund or defund executive 
operations as it sees fit.  
Shallow secrets may function as singular points of privilege that preserve the 
separation of powers. Deep secrets can open up black holes into which the powers 
of a coordinate branch and the rule of law disappear. There is no specific textual 
hook on which to hang this claim, but the structural harm caused by black holes can 
be inferred from basic principles of accountability, diffused authority, and checks 
and balances that underlie our tripartite system. 
In this vein, we might note that the most clearly preclusive powers assigned by 
the Constitution to the President are powers that may not be realized in secret. The 
enumerated presidential powers typically recognized as preclusive, in the sense that 
no other branch can claim any overlapping or checking authority, are the pardon 
power and the nominations and treaty-making powers in advance of Senate 
ratification.209 (The power to provide for the national defense, including the power 
to classify and control information, is emphatically not preclusive in this sense, as 
Congress controls numerous aspects of warmaking as well as appropriations and 
legislation generally.)210 At any given time, the President may be hatching secret 
plans regarding pardons, nominations, or treaties, and he has no express 
207. This is a somewhat different sort of black hole from the one explored by Adrian 
Vermeule in his recent article on Carl Schmitt. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative 
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009). Vermeule argues that United States administrative law is 
Schmittian, in the sense that it contemplates emergency situations in which the executive will be 
able to operate free from effective legal constraint. The suggestion here is that even in these 
situations the Constitution imposes a minimal (and not necessarily ex ante) duty of interbranch 
publicity, that it proscribes informational black holes. Whether that duty can be enforced by 
Congress or the judiciary is a separate question. 
208. I thank Eric Citron for the event horizon metaphor. 
209. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest 
Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 113-14 (1996). Neal Devins adds to the list 
“matters of current military significance.” Id. at 114. For reasons explained below, see infra notes 
210, 231-247 and accompanying text, I believe this is generally incorrect. One might also add the 
President’s Opinions Clause power to require that principal officers of executive departments 
deliver opinions relating to the duties of their offices. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. This power 
does not inherently generate publicity as do the powers mentioned in the main text, but it is also 
less significant consequentially. It is purely administrative—the power to force internal discussion 
of an idea, not to move an idea toward consummation. 
210. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 40, at 15; Barron & Lederman, supra note 187, at 729-50. 
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constitutional duty to tell anyone a word about them. But the President also has no 
ability to effectuate these plans except through highly visible processes, the latter 
two requiring Senate approval. Where the Constitution most clearly grants to one 
individual powers that no one else can claim, they are powers that generate 
disclosure as a necessary incident of their realization. The potential for deliberative 
deep secrecy is checked by the impossibility of consummated deep secrecy; 
preclusivity is checked by publicity.  
The best constitutional argument in favor of executive branch secrecy, that the 
structure (and text and history) of the Constitution marks the executive as the 
privileged domain of clandestine action, does not fully counteract these insights. 
The key structural point is that the nation sometimes will need one branch “to act 
quickly and decisively, with unity, energy, vigor, dispatch, and, if need be, 
secrecy,”211 and the executive is clearly designed to be that branch. Depth may be 
useful for such decisive action. If keeping a deep secret might reasonably be 
expected to save the nation, then the President may be able to claim a constitutional 
license—and a duty—to do so. This is the immovable, paternalistic core of the case 
for presidential deep secrecy. 
But notice how dangerous this argument is. It assumes that deep secrecy will in 
fact lead to better outcomes. It allows the President to determine in what 
circumstances it will be appropriate to use a tool that aggrandizes his own power. It 
undermines one of the core normative premises of the unitary executive theory, 
which is that assigning exclusive authority to a single administrator clarifies the 
nature of that authority and so permits greater popular accountability. And it cuts 
out the other branches. These criticisms cannot establish that the President must 
abstain from effecting policies no one outside the executive branch knows about. 
They suggest, however, that he was not meant to do so except perhaps in extremis, 
in the conduct of emergency governance, and never for any extended amount of 
time.  
d. Prudence 
More so than the other interpretive modalities, the prudential evaluation of 
secrecy’s role in the Constitution has an unavoidable empirical foundation. If 
someone argues, in the manner of Justice Jackson, that the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact,212 and that consequently the CIA should be allowed to conduct covert 
operations without informing Congress beforehand, she is making an argument not 
only about constitutional meaning but also about facts on the ground. She is 
assuming that a rule permitting undisclosed covert operations will serve the value 
of national security better than a contrary rule. If in fact these CIA operations tend 
to undermine security rather than enhance it, then not only would it be wrong, on 
prudential grounds, to claim a constitutional mandate on behalf of the practice; it 
211. Amar, supra note 143, at 2005. 
212. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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would be more plausible to claim that the practice is counter-constitutional because 
it offends one of the core consequentialist values the document was intended to 
protect. And as we have already seen, the utility of deep state secrecy as a method 
of governance is highly dubious.213  
Another way to think about prudence and the constitutionality of state secrecy 
is to ask whether the political structures established by the Constitution are 
sufficient to ensure adequate transparency in government. Distinguished 
commentators including Justice Scalia, Neal Devins, and Mark Rozell have argued 
that the answer is yes, and that this helps explain why the President should not be 
compelled by statute or by court order to turn over documents he has determined to 
withhold.214 We need not worry that this will lead to suboptimal disclosure, they 
argue, because Congress has a plethora of tools at its disposal with which to 
threaten or punish a recalcitrant executive: for instance, the power to withhold 
funds or to stall nominations. In today’s media environment, some have suggested 
that the greater risk is overdisclosure, as even valid claims of presidential privilege 
can carry serious political costs.215  
On this view, the most desirable approach to secrecy, at least as a default rule, 
is to “[d]o [n]othing,”216 to have faith in the political system and to abandon the 
quest for any substantive constitutional principle to guide disclosure 
determinations. A cynic might reply that this claim is contradicted by history—
think, for example, of the disturbing revelations made by the Church 
Committee217—or by basic political science—think, for example, of periods of 
unified government in which the branches share the same political incentives, 
periods of divided government in which one branch has the political power to bully 
the other branch into submission, or periods of unreasonably stubborn 
administrations. Once again, we are back to empirics. At the bottom of Scalia’s, 
Devins’s, and Rozell’s arguments is a claim that judicially enforced access rights 
will only make things worse. Whether this is correct cannot be proven. 
When it comes to deep secrecy, however, the Scalia-Devins-Rozell line of 
argument misses the mark. Scholars have tended to conflate the question of how 
much information the President has a duty to disclose with the question of how 
much information Congress or the judiciary may force him to disclose. Yet the two 
questions are not coterminous, not only because the President has an independent 
responsibility to comply with the Constitution,218 but also because some amount of 
213. See supra Part III.A.2. 
214. ROZELL, supra note 70, at 156-69; Devins, supra note 209, at 126-37; Antonin Scalia, 
The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, 19. 
215. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 621 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “the 
political damage” that assertions of executive privilege “often entail[]”); Marshall, supra note 156, 
at 811 (“[B]ecause of the media, the purported trump card in the President’s hand, the claim of 
executive privilege, is actually a joker.”). 
216. Devins, supra note 209, at 109. 
217. See infra note 317 and accompanying text. 
218. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (Oath Clause). 
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publicity is a necessary precondition for information-access disputes to arise in the 
first place. This precondition cannot be taken for granted. Even if one believes that 
the political give-and-take inherent in our tripartite system ensures the President 
will not go too far in withholding information the people and their representatives 
wish to see, it does not follow that he will be sufficiently forthcoming with 
information about which the outside world is unaware. To the contrary, the political 
cost of asserting executive privilege gives Presidents a strong incentive to use deep 
secrecy any time they make a controversial move. Congress and the public will 
always be the “losers” of access disputes that never materialize; the President will 
always be the judge of his own case.  
The notion that it is desirable, consequentially, for Presidents to feel they have 
no constitutional obligation to comply with certain types of document requests is 
plausible, if unfalsifiable. The notion that it is desirable for Presidents to feel they 
have no obligation to disclose the basic contours of what they have done—no 
obligation to permit even the possibility of document requests—is much more 
radical. It would take a remarkable (indeed, a blind) faith in the relative virtues of 
the executive branch to defend the latter claim. 
e. Doctrine 
We come at last to the doctrine. My claim here is that, while strongly affirming 
the constitutionality of government secrecy in numerous contexts, the Supreme 
Court has made several interpretive moves that could be used to draw a line at deep 
secrecy. I cannot pretend that the deep/shallow distinction holds great explanatory 
power for a doctrine that never once acknowledges it. But I believe it can help 
illuminate some of the holdings’ underlying logic. 
Most commentators take the courtroom-access cases to be the key judicial 
precedents on the constitutional right to know. For several reasons, however, these 
cases have only limited application to deep secrets. First, as explained above, 
although criminal trials, voir dire proceedings, and the like may constitute 
important domains of secrecy, they are unlikely to implicate much deep secrecy.219 
Second, even if the Court chose to ground its pro-access holdings in a “structural” 
theory of the First Amendment that cannot logically be limited to judicial 
proceedings (or to formal government proceedings, privileges, or institutions of any 
kind),220 no such doctrinal migration ever came to pass. The Court’s long silence 
on information-access rights, and its confinement of these rights to the context of 
judicial proceedings, caution against divining any broader lessons from the 
219. See supra p. 305. 
220. “Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials,” Justice Brennan 
declared in the most thoroughly reasoned majority opinion in this series, “is the common 
understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs’” and thereby “to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate 
in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
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opinions.  
Third, Justice Brennan’s two-part test for evaluating access claims221 does not 
handle deep secrecy well. The test’s “experience” prong asks whether the practice 
in question has “a tradition of accessibility.”222 As explained above, deep secrets 
distort our ability to perceive historical patterns and, in virtue of their obscurity, 
would not merit precedential weight even if a consistent tradition could be 
perceived in hindsight.223 It cannot be a valid constitutional justification for a 
practice’s being cloaked in deep secrecy that it has always been so cloaked. The 
test’s “logic” prong asks whether public access is “important in terms of [the] 
process” in question.224 Public access is the only antidote to the shallow secrecy of 
a closed proceeding; it is not the only antidote to deep secrecy. To remedy the 
gratuitous or illegitimate use of deep secrets in a given process does not necessarily 
require opening up that process to the public or the press, just to additional 
government actors. Justice Brennan’s test is not well engineered to identify partial 
solutions between total opacity and full public access, solutions that vindicate the 
public’s practical and constitutional interests without actually permitting them an 
admission ticket.225 Yet this is the middle space in which the deep/shallow 
distinction may be most relevant. 
No, the most suggestive line of doctrine is not the courtroom-access cases but 
rather the congressional-inquiry cases and separation-of-powers cases more 
generally, not the opinions that reason from the First Amendment but the ones that 
reason from constitutional structure. At least since the 1926 case of McGrain v. 
Daugherty,226 the Supreme Court has taken an extremely broad view of 
Congress’s power to investigate the other branches, emphasizing that “the power of 
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the 
legislative function,”227 that Congress may use this power not only to generate 
legislation but also for an “‘informing function’” and to expose malfeasance,228 
and that “[t]o be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end 
result.”229 The Court has established one limit on interbranch inquiry relevant for 
our purposes: a bar on investigating “matters which are within the exclusive 
221. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (summarizing the test and noting its 
continued application). 
222. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
223. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
224. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
225. As Heidi Kitrosser persuasively points out, Justice Brennan’s test also is not well 
engineered to vindicate the theory of the First Amendment that purportedly grounds it. Kitrosser, 
supra note 153, at 114.  
226. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
227. Id. at 174. 
228. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (quoting WOODROW WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885)). 
229. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975). 
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province of one of the other branches of the Government.”230 If it is within the 
“exclusive province” of the executive branch to execute the laws, negotiate treaties, 
or command the military, this bar implies that Congress has no power to demand an 
accounting of the President’s activities in these spheres—and that the President 
may therefore keep the information a deep secret from legislators.  
Yet in practice, as William Marshall has demonstrated, the “exclusive 
province” limitation has proven feeble to the point of irrelevance.231 The Court has 
never once applied it against the executive branch, and to the contrary, the Court 
has repeatedly upheld congressional inquiries into executive activities—from 
“military action, [to] foreign policy, [to] bureaucratic administration, [to] 
prosecutorial judgment”232—that one might have thought good candidates. 
Marshall concludes that the limitation “may only stand for the proposition that the 
Congress, through its investigative powers, cannot interfere with or attempt to alter 
a judicial proceeding.”233 The logic of these holdings strongly undermines the 
notion of a presidential power to use deep secrecy (at least, deeper than the point of 
meaningful congressional awareness). If Congress has a constitutional right and 
“duty”234 to inquire into virtually every last thing the executive does, it cannot also 
be the case that the executive has a right to prevent Congress from learning where 
to look, thereby rendering its inquiries fruitless. Even if the President does not have 
a constitutional responsibility to facilitate Congress’s power of inquiry, presumably 
he has a responsibility not to subvert it.  
In their constricted reading of the “exclusive province” limitation, the 
congressional-inquiry cases are consistent with the Court’s general posture of 
acknowledging the theoretical possibility of “conclusive and preclusive” 
presidential powers,235 while declining to recognize virtually any powers as 
actually meeting that standard.236 True, the Court has recognized the executive 
privilege, the state secrets privilege, and the President’s authority to classify and 
230. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959); accord Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1880); see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (listing the 
other substantive constraints). 
231. Marshall, supra note 156, at 800-03. 
232. Id. at 802 (citations omitted). 
233. Id. at 802-03. 
234. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 n.6 (1951) (“‘[I]t is the proper duty of a 
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what 
it sees . . . .’” (quoting with approval WILSON, supra note 228, at 303). 
235. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
236. The most obvious counterexamples are the Court’s pardon power holdings. See Schick 
v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866); see also 
Barron & Lederman, supra note 187, at 728 & n.115 (discussing these cases and concluding that 
Congress likely retains some power to “affect the President’s pardoning practices,” as through 
“disclosure requirements and bribery restrictions [for] those who lobby the President for 
pardons”). As explained above, see supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text, the pardon 
power generates publicity as a necessary incident of its exercise, and therefore permits only 
shallow consummated secrecy. 
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control information bearing on national security or foreign affairs, and threatened to 
invalidate government actions that “unduly interfer[e] with the role”237 or 
“undermine the authority and independence”238 of a coordinate branch. But the 
Court has also made clear that executive privilege is not absolute,239 that courts 
must resolve claims of the state secrets privilege for themselves,240 that Congress 
has extensive powers relating to national security and foreign affairs,241 that “a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President,”242 and that, in wartime as in 
peacetime, the President’s power to pursue a course of action is diminished to the 
extent Congress regulates the action pursuant to its constitutional authorities.243 In 
these cases and many others, the Court has rejected a vision of the Constitution that 
“requires that the three branches of Government ‘operate with absolute 
independence.’”244 Especially following its functionalist turn in the late 1980s,245 
the Court has instead tended to valorize the flexibility246 and “inevitable 
friction”247 that the separation of powers entails. 
Each of the aforementioned Supreme Court holdings is also consistent with the 
Court’s position that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law 
237. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988). 
238. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). 
239. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-07 (1974). 
240. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (“The court itself must determine 
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege . . . .” (footnote omitted)). The 
Reynolds Court also observed cryptically that “broad” assertions of the privilege, whereby 
executive officials claim the “power to withhold any documents in their custody from judicial 
view if they deem it to be in the public interest,” have “constitutional overtones.” Id. at 6. 
241. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591-92 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 256 (1967); 
Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964). 
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion). 
243. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring); Scholars’ War Powers Letter, supra note 123, at 2-5 (documenting the Court’s 
consistent stance that the President must comply with applicable statutory limits in wartime); see 
also FISHER, supra note 187, at 7 (asserting that none of the cases typically cited by the executive 
branch in secrecy disputes “supports the view that the President’s authority over national security 
information is in any sense plenary or exclusive”); Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: 
Against the View That Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the 
Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1706-07 (2007) (observing that the motivating 
assumption behind Youngstown categories two and three is a conflict-sorting principle of 
“categorical congressional supremacy”—the principle that “wherever congressional power 
overlaps with antecedent presidential powers, congressional action categorically trumps”—and 
that in national security policy as in virtually every other area, the Court has established a 
constitutional norm of “overlapping governmental authority” rather than strict departmentalism). 
244. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707). 
245. Rosen, supra note 243, at 1735. 
246. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (characterizing the Court as 
having consistently adopted a “flexible understanding of separation of powers”). 
247. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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of the Constitution.”248 Like it or not, the Supreme Court’s assertion of judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation similarly undermines the basis for a 
presidential deep secrecy power. For how can the Court faithfully and efficaciously 
resolve constitutional controversies if the executive branch takes actions so secret 
no one can challenge them? And how can the Court be sure that its interpretations 
are in fact functioning as the supreme law of the land if the executive may apply 
them (or decline to apply them) in unknown ways? 
All of this is to say that, if a President were to assert the power to keep 
Congress or the judiciary in the dark about his activities, the doctrine provides 
ample precedents with which to rebut the assertion. Given the inherent feature of 
deep secrets that they disable outsiders’ checking abilities, the President would be 
on firm ground in claiming the right to use them only in the exercise of an 
uncheckable power or when the inability to do so would substantially undermine 
his constitutional role. Yet, the Court has never once recognized a presidential 
secrecy power, or a national-security- or foreign-affairs-related power more 
generally, as “conclusive and preclusive”249 in this sense. And while Congress has 
generally avoided pushing the boundaries of its authority to request sensitive 
information, the Court has never once invalidated any such effort as a functional 
impediment to the President’s role. Judged by these standards, it seems implausible 
to maintain that the President must have the power to keep deep secrets to be able 
to do his job, or to do it well. 
This bird’s-eye view of a vast swath of cases is necessarily unsatisfying and 
neglects much nuance. But it allows us to see a basic commonality. The broad 
doctrinal themes I have touched on—the expansive and near-plenary power of 
congressional inquiry, interdependent rather than wholly independent branches, and 
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation—all provide conceptual and 
normative tools for rejecting any government actor’s claim to a deep secrecy 
power. The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers case law has consistently 
intimated an attractive and coherent anti-ignorance principle of constitutional 
government. In a variety of interpretive modes and a variety of contexts, the Court 
has consistently cast doubt on the notion that one branch of government can take 
actions about which the others have no clue.  
IV. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 
If this Article has made a convincing case that deep state secrecy ought to be 
avoided whenever feasible, the question arises how we might achieve this aim. In 
this Part, I sketch possible responses in the United States context, and I compare 
them briefly to the practices of the George W. Bush administration. My list of 
solutions is by no means comprehensive. I seek only to outline in broad form the 
kinds of mechanisms that can be useful at moderating depth and improving 
248. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
249. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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democratic decision making, without spilling sensitive content to the world at large. 
The general strategy has a nested structure: when public disclosure and 
deliberation cannot be permitted in advance, interbranch disclosure and deliberation 
ought to take its place; when interbranch disclosure is not feasible, interagency 
deliberation ought to substitute; and when interagency disclosure is not feasible, 
more robust intra-agency deliberation should be pursued.250 By disaggregating the 
government, by seeing official secret-keepers as a plural “they” rather than a 
singular “it,” we open up the possibility of partial solutions that do not entail the 
public’s involvement. Although widening and diversifying the circle of secret-
keepers may increase the risk of spilling secrets, this risk can be managed. (And 
this risk is not intrinsically undesirable. Some secrets conceal content that should be 
spilled to the public; some types of conduct should be deterred.) Institutional depth 
is remediable in a way that interpersonal depth is not.  
A word, first, about reforms that are not likely to be useful toward this end. For 
all of its transformative potential to open up government and “pierce the veil of 
administrative secrecy,”251 the Freedom of Information Act is not likely to pierce 
the veil of deep secrecy. FOIA requests, as explained above, must be precisely 
framed to generate responsive records.252 No one will be able to meet this standard 
when they do not know what they do not know. The Bush administration 
debilitated FOIA in a variety of ways, including long delays in processing requests, 
aggressive use of exemptions, fee-waiver denials, and a reversal of the Clinton-era 
presumption in favor of disclosure;253 and many in the open-government 
movement are justly focused on rectifying these trends. But they must look 
elsewhere to rectify misuses of deep secrecy. 
The point is larger than FOIA. All transparency mechanisms that are reactive 
in nature, that trigger disclosure only upon specific request by an information-
outsider, face a problem of prerequisite knowledge. These mechanisms can help 
250. What happens when the secret-keepers believe none of these options is feasible? And 
by what standard should feasibility be measured? A rigorous answer lies beyond this Article’s 
scope, but the analysis above suggests some rules of thumb: it will generally be less objectionable 
for an executive branch component to keep outsiders in the dark about the existence of a policy to 
the extent the secret-keepers have clear positive authority to act in the area, there is a crisis 
situation, the policy’s aims are narrow and uncontroversial, the potential costs of disclosure are 
severe, and the secret-keepers acknowledge what they have done as fully, broadly, and quickly as 
possible after the fact. 
251. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Seth Kreimer provides exceptionally rich celebrations of FOIA’s ability to facilitate and 
authenticate government disclosures in Kreimer, supra note 74, and Kreimer, supra note 78. 
252. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. While FOIA’s requirement that users 
“reasonably describe[]” the records they seek, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006), could be 
liberalized, the results would quickly overwhelm agencies and users alike. Some manner of 
framing requirement is a practical necessity in a requester-driven disclosure regime. To the extent 
we want to force agencies to reveal high-level policy decisions, as opposed to specific records 
reasonably described, public disclosure requirements are preferable to individualized FOIA 
requests. 
253. See WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 5, at 2-31. 
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keep shallow secrets accessible and comprehensible. They are not well suited to 
making deep secrets any more checkable, and to the contrary may push officials 
toward depth precisely to evade their reach. 
Along with FOIA and the classification system, the other main institutional 
target of open-government advocates has been the courts.254 A large body of 
commentary urges judges to push back against executive excesses and demand 
persuasive justifications from those who wish to claim a FOIA exemption, assert 
the state secrets or executive privilege, or otherwise deny disclosure. Yet even the 
most determined judge could not reliably push back against deep secrets.255 Apart 
from the traditional concerns about institutional competence and justiciability, the 
reason is that lawsuits, like FOIA requests, require sufficient prerequisite 
knowledge to be actionable. Courts, too, are reactive mechanisms. 
Rigorous judicial review could make some important contributions, as 
forced disclosures may turn up unanticipated or partially anticipated 
information that leads to the unraveling of deeper secrets. For example, judges 
could restrict executive branch secrecy privileges as much as possible to 
specifically identified content. This would mean, among other things, that 
judges reject the Bush administration’s goals of using executive privilege to 
avoid compliance with congressional subpoenas and of applying the state 
secrets privilege to entire categories of (alleged) government activity.256 It 
could help still more if judges devised means to evaluate systems of secrecy, 
above and beyond any particular item of information.257 For instance, they 
could give greater weight to secrecy justifications that have been subjected to 
greater amounts of interagency process, thereby tying deference to shallowness, 
and they could invalidate executive practices that are likely to lead to violations 
of the anti-ignorance principle.258 But judicial review is bound to be a limited 
tool for addressing secrets that lurk in the shadows and are perceived only 
hazily, if at all, by the parties who seek them. Depth must be minimized at an 
earlier stage in the policy process. 
254. See Kreimer, supra note 78, at 1215-16 (cataloguing recent criticisms); see also Steven 
Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399 
(2009) (summarizing the literature on overclassification and recommending reforms). 
255. But see infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (discussing the possible use of 
specially-constituted courts, as in FISA). 
256. The latter move is one of the key prescriptions of the leading judicial secrecy bill in 
Congress, the State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009). See S. REP. NO. 110-442, 
at 11-12, 20-25 (2008) (explaining why the bill “forbids judges from dismissing cases at the 
pleadings stage on the basis of the privilege”). 
257. For interesting variations on this idea, see Cheh, supra note 69, at 730-34; Samaha, 
supra note 51, at 960-63. 
258. See supra Part III.C.2.e (final paragraph) (explaining the anti-ignorance principle); see 
also supra Part III.C.2.c (arguing that the Constitution proscribes informational black holes). 
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A. Second-Order Disclosure Requirements 
More promising than either FOIA or the courts, for the goal of minimizing 
deep secrecy, are simple disclosure requirements. We have many of these 
already.259 The President or a subordinate must provide annual reports to Congress 
on dozens upon dozens of matters, along with discrete reports any time he takes 
certain specific actions, such as providing arms to foreign governments260 or 
authorizing covert action.261 The reports are typically unclassified, though they 
sometimes include a classified annex. These laws are classic tools for reducing 
depth, as they provide the public, as well as a differently situated group of officials 
in Congress, with regular, structured notice about what the executive has been 
doing. They are particularly useful at reducing depth when they require prior 
notification, rather than subsequent or annual notification, and when they specify in 
detail the disclosures they seek. Of course, an executive official might choose not to 
comply with any particular reporting requirement, and outsiders might never learn. 
But the existence of the requirement raises the costs of such secrecy—that official 
is now a lawbreaker—and it enhances the political standing of Congress, the courts, 
and the public to punish violations that are found out.  
Separate from noncompliance, however, reporting requirements have inherent 
limitations that blunt their ability to expose government secrets. Most basically, it is 
impossible to specify in advance all of the information that may become relevant to 
voters and lawmakers. Human events are too fluid; Congress’s predictive powers 
are too limited. If Congress makes its reporting requirements highly detailed or 
numerous, it risks creating excessive administrative costs not only for the executive 
but also for itself, owing to the need to process the data it receives. If Congress 
makes the requirements highly stringent or categorical, it risks undermining 
legitimate goals that secrecy is meant to serve. A legislature can only go so far in 
invigorating public disclosure laws without taking on the entire system of executive 
secrecy. 
There are three basic strategies for dealing with these concerns that preserve 
ample space for shallow secrets but not for deep ones. The first is to raise the level 
of generality. To moderate depth without falling prey to the problem of prerequisite 
knowledge, demanding undue specificity, or forfeiting the advantages of secrecy, 
Congress can demand public disclosure of second-order policy choices made by the 
executive branch (the types of activities it has taken, for what reasons, pursuant to 
what processes and legal authorities), while forgoing disclosure of the first-order 
choices embedded within (the specific content of those activities). In Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson’s terms, Congress can pass legislation that permits 
“particular secrets” about identifiable sources and targets and the like, while 
259. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2341 (2006). According to Katyal, 
executive-congressional reporting requirements “have gone without much scholarly analysis.” Id. 
260. 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a)(3) (2006). 
261. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1) (2006). 
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forbidding “general secrets” about higher-level plans and goals.262 Second-order 
disclosure requirements can make the activities of government “translucent,”263 if 
not always transparent. 
The second, and related, strategy is to bifurcate disclosure requirements so that 
members of Congress must be apprised of sensitive information that is denied to 
the public. Congress can stand in for the people when the potential costs of full 
disclosure seem too high. Third, reporting requirements can be aimed not just at 
discrete areas of policymaking but also at legal interpretation. Learning what the 
President believes he is permitted to do will often provide insight into what he is 
likely to do. 
It turns out that a number of commentators have advocated new second-order 
disclosure requirements recently, although they have not identified them as such. 
Neal Katyal has proposed that the President be required to notify Congress any 
time he decides a particular treaty does not apply to a particular conflict.264 Heidi 
Kitrosser has proposed that the President be required to publish a notice in the 
Federal Register any time he modifies, revokes, suspends, or waives a published 
executive order.265 Dawn Johnsen and Trevor Morrison have proposed that the 
Attorney General be required to report to Congress any time he invokes the 
constitutional avoidance canon in interpreting a statute.266 
All of these proposals use the first strategy, requiring executive officials to 
disclose the fact that they have taken a particular type of act without necessarily 
disclosing its content. Each could be augmented by a requirement that the content 
itself be made available to members of Congress. In this vein, Congress recently 
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to require the Attorney General 
to provide the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary committees a copy of 
262. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 106-11; see also supra notes 46-47 and 
accompanying text (discussing the capacity of second-order publicity rules to reduce depth). 
While it may be quite difficult in some cases to draw a principled line between particular, first-
order information and general, second-order information, any such effort would help reduce deep 
secrecy. 
263. Samaha, supra note 51, at 923, 969. 
264. Katyal, supra note 259, at 2341. 
265. Letter from Heidi Kitrosser, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to Edward M. 
Kennedy, Senator 3 (May 19, 2008), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/ 
ruleoflaw/testimony/kitrosser.pdf (endorsing a proposal suggested by Senator Feingold’s written 
questions following Professor Kitrosser’s testimony before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution).  
266. Johnsen, supra note 7, at 1599-1600; Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in 
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1237-39 (2006). The Attorney General would 
have to identify the offending statute, but he would not have to identify specific policy decisions 
that may be implicated by his use of the avoidance canon. This proposal builds on an existing 
statute that requires the Attorney General to report to Congress whenever the Justice Department 
determines to refrain from enforcing a statute or complying with a judicial decision on the ground 
that the operative legal provision is unconstitutional. 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006). Johnsen and 
Morrison do not address the possibility that the Attorney General would practice a kind of double 
avoidance, secretly invoking the avoidance canon in refusing to comply with the very law that 
requires him to report on his use of the canon. 
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any decision by a FISA court “that includes significant construction or 
interpretation of any provision of [the Act], and any pleadings, applications, or 
memoranda of law associated with such decision.”267 The public still has 
guaranteed access only to aggregate statistics on FISA’s usage,268 but four 
congressional committees will now have access to the substance of FISA 
jurisprudence.  
More ambitiously (and more costly), executive departments could be 
compelled to follow Sweden’s model and keep a list of the actionable documents 
they generate in an official register.269 Less ambitiously, they could be compelled 
to keep a list of the types of documents or plans they generate. Specific items could 
still be withheld from specific requesters. But the register would guard against 
disappearing records, and it would provide enough information about enough items 
that outsiders would have a sense of what each department was up to. Even if 
access were limited to government officials, the creation of any such register could 
significantly reduce the depth of secret agency action. 
The desire to invigorate our second-order disclosure laws comes in response to 
recent events. The Bush administration kept Congress and the American public in 
the dark about remarkably basic aspects of its “War on Terror.” Until the leaks 
started to appear, often several years after the fact, the administration refused to 
disclose its decision that the Geneva Conventions pose no obstacle to the CIA’s 
holding and interrogating unacknowledged “ghost detainees” in unacknowledged 
“black sites” across the globe,270 that the Convention Against Torture and the 
federal anti-torture statute do not restrain the President in wartime,271 or that the 
President may use the National Security Agency to conduct electronic surveillance 
on Americans in contravention of FISA.272 It refused to disclose plans to establish 
267. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 103(c)(1), 122 Stat. 2436, 
2460 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c)(1) (West 2009)).  
268. 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2006). 
269. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 220 (explaining the Swedish model). Internal working 
drafts are exempted from the register. 
270. The existence of the CIA black sites was first disclosed by the Washington Post in late 
2005, perhaps four years after the sites had been established. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror 
Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1; see also JANE MAYER, THE DARK 
SIDE 148 (2008) (reporting that we still do not know any precise locations). 
271. The infamous OLC “Torture Memo” that made these claims, Memorandum from Jay 
S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf, 
was not leaked until the spring of 2004, nearly two years after its issuance. Morrison, supra note 
266, at 1238. 
272. The OLC analysis supporting this determination still has not been made public. In 
former OLC head Jack Goldsmith’s memorable telling, “[a]fter 9/11 [the Vice President and his 
Counsel] and other top officials in the administration dealt with FISA the way they dealt with 
other laws they didn’t like: they blew through them in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that 
they guarded closely so no one could question the legal basis for the operations.” JACK 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 181 (2007); see also ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW 155-58 
(2008) (describing the administration’s “go-it-alone approach” in circumventing FISA). 
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new programs of detention, rendition, interrogation, and surveillance. These secrets 
involved not merely tactical decisions about particular targets or methods, but high-
level legal and policy decisions about the nature of the “War on Terror.” Perhaps 
the closest the administration came to providing advance notice of these 
enormously controversial moves was Vice President Cheney’s cryptic statement 
shortly after the 9/11 attacks that, in fighting terrorism, the administration would 
“have to work sort of the dark side,” to “spend time in the shadows.”273 
The legacy of the Bush administration provides powerful anecdotal evidence 
that new second-order disclosure rules may be needed to illuminate this 
netherworld. To combat deep secrecy, leaks are not an adequate or attractive 
substitute for prophylactic measures. Leaks have proven too unreliable, partial, and 
belated, and they are too destructive in their own right; they may also be criminal 
offenses. If second-order disclosure rules serve no other purpose, they can at least 
provide insight into how the President is interpreting and enforcing the Constitution 
and the laws Congress has passed. 
B. Congressional-Executive Consultation 
The obvious downsides of second-order disclosure requirements, from the 
vantage point of those on the receiving end, are that they may be too generalized to 
permit rigorous scrutiny, they almost always occur after the fact, and they are 
unidirectional, rather than dialogic, in nature. It may therefore be attractive to 
supplement them with consultation requirements, pursuant to which executive 
secret-keepers must actively explain and defend their plans to outsiders during the 
policy formulation window. Which outsiders?  
The idea of using Congress to serve this function—to mediate the tension 
between the need for occasional executive branch secrecy, on the one hand, and the 
democratic and deliberative deficits this secrecy entails, on the other—connects 
with several major themes of this Article. The deep/shallow distinction has helped 
us to see that for our transparency structures to be working well, we do not always 
need the circle of secret-keepers to be large. We need it to be diverse. A secret Y 
may be unknown to millions of citizens, yet well-known to a wide range of 
government actors who have been charged by the people with evaluating it on their 
behalf. Compared to secret X that is unknown to all but a small cabal of like-
minded officials, secret Y may be less objectionable from the standpoint of law, 
policy, morality, and democratic theory, irrespective of either secret’s content.  
Congress is the natural choice to provide the intra-keeper pluralism needed to 
273. Interview by Tim Russert with Richard Cheney, Meet the Press (NBC television 
broadcast Sept. 16, 2001), quoted in MAYER, supra note 270, at 9-10. These lines had a double 
meaning. The counterterrorism effort, they insinuated, would be not only observationally dark but 
morally dark, not only opaque but unpleasant. A (vice-)head of state faced with an elemental 
threat to his country, Cheney was expressing the atavistic desire to operate without scrutiny or 
constraint. His imagery foreshadowed an intent to maintain through deep secrecy a dimension in 
which the normal rules do not apply. 
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move a secret from X to Y.274 Members of Congress have a direct democratic 
connection to the people they serve, a compelling constitutional and practical claim 
to information that may be relevant to their legislative duties, and the institutional 
resources to evaluate and critique sensitive plans. All of this is in contrast to Article 
III judges, who are not even allowed to render advisory opinions. The example of 
FISA shows that some valuable forms of judicial-executive “consultation” can be 
engineered to ensure the legality of secret executive programs.275 But the FISA 
model, in which special courts review surveillance plans prior to implementation, 
could not be extended to many other substantive areas or to strictly policymaking 
questions without radical reform of our constitutional system.276 Members of 
Congress, more so than judges, are ideally positioned to serve as the people’s proxy 
in vetting and checking otherwise deep presidential secrets. 
To some extent, they already do so. The President routinely consults with 
congressional leaders on his own initiative, and members of Congress routinely 
demand consultation in the form of oversight hearings, investigations, and 
information requests. No doubt some secrets are disclosed in these interactions. A 
few statutes go further and specify discrete modes of consultation on confidential 
matters, such as the requirement that the President notify the “Gang of Eight” (the 
leaders of the House and Senate and their intelligence committees) “as soon as 
possible” when he makes a finding in support of covert action and “determines that 
it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting vital interests of the United States.”277 But there are clearly gaps in this 
structure, and much congressional-executive consultation occurs only episodically, 
or occurs only after the executive’s secret plans have solidified or been realized. 
The George W. Bush presidency revealed how often, and how easily, the vast 
majority of Congress may be cut out in the area of national security. The 
274. The other natural choice is different departments within the executive branch. As the 
following Subpart explains, I believe that internal checks on deep secrecy are both independently 
attractive and practically essential, given that executive secret-keepers will not always have the 
time, will, or authority to run their plans by Congress. But it is important to bear in mind that 
internal consultation mechanisms will never be able to provide the degree of democratic or 
constitutional legitimacy provided by congressional (and judicial) mechanisms. 
275. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing FISA’s utility in reducing the 
depth of surveillance-related secrets). 
276. The historical unwillingness of the FISA court to say no to the executive might suggest 
additional limits on the efficacy of any nonpublic judicial check. Many commentators have called 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a “rubber stamp” for approving nearly one-hundred 
percent of the surveillance orders submitted by the executive branch. See, e.g., Note, Shifting the 
FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial Approval, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 2200, 2206 (2008). These criticisms have some bite, but they overlook the extent to which 
the FISA court requires executive officials to modify orders before it will approve them, as well as 
the extent to which the mere existence of FISA court review forces intelligence agencies to 
internalize relevant laws, to focus resources on high-priority targets, to justify their practices, and 
to collaborate with the Justice Department. Sky-high approval rates do not necessarily imply a 
toothless or captured review mechanism. 
277. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1), (2) (2006). 
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administration never told most members of Congress about the evidentiary holes in 
the claim that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons of mass 
destruction.278 It never told most members about its plans to use interrogation 
methods widely seen as torture.279 It never told most members about its plans to 
launch the Terrorist Surveillance Program.280 It never alerted Congress to its most 
controversial Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions.281 When the administration 
did provide congressional briefings on highly sensitive subjects, it frequently 
sought to limit them to the Gang of Eight and to prohibit the Gang from sharing 
what it learned with cleared staff or with other members.282 These briefings may 
have helped create a historical record of the administration’s conduct, but at the 
time they led to little pushback, exposure, or statutory revision. 
Even after sympathetic leadership from the same political party took control of 
Congress, Bush officials continued to resist interbranch consultation on matters 
relating to counterterrorism. Perhaps they believed that, relative to executive 
personnel, members of Congress “leak[] like a sieve”283—that when the circle of 
secret-keepers is widened to include authorities from another branch, the odds of 
public disclosure increase not linearly but geometrically. This theory is not 
implausible, yet to my knowledge no one inside or outside the administration ever 
marshaled any evidence, even anecdotal evidence, to justify it. 
Are there ways to invigorate Congress’s consultative role on matters unknown 
to the public, and thereby to reduce their depth, without enfeebling the presidency 
or publicizing sensitive content? Consultative requirements are significantly more 
intrusive than disclosure requirements, and Congress must therefore be cautious in 
establishing them. But modest improvements are possible. 
A wealth of suggestions has already been offered by Harold Koh. Koh has 
proposed identifying a core group of members “with whom the President and his 
staff could regularly meet and consult on national security matters,”284 creating a 
278. See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., REINING IN THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 233, 253-63 (2009) [hereinafter CONYERS REPORT]. 
279. See id. at 123-37 (characterizing the “battle” between Congress and the President over 
interrogation techniques as beginning with the leak of the Torture Memo in June of 2004). 
280. Id. at 146-55. 
281. See Johnsen, supra note 7, at 1596 (observing that the Bush OLC “released shockingly 
few of its legal opinions” in any form). 
282. See CONYERS REPORT, supra note 278, at 297-98 (describing efforts of the Bush 
administration to use Gang-of-Eight briefings beyond the limits imposed by 50 U.S.C. § 
413b(c)(2)). 
283. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 
885 (2007). 
284. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1327 (1988) [hereinafter Koh, Iran-Contra]; 
see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 164 (1990) [hereinafter 
KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY] (recommending legislative reforms to strengthen congressional 
consultation on covert action specifically). These regular meetings would allow for significantly 
more collaboration, earlier in the policymaking process, than the irregular Gang-of-Eight briefings 
that are currently used. 
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Comptroller-General-like entity “to monitor the output of the Executive’s national 
security apparatus,”285 and increasing congressional access to classified and 
unclassified national security information, including the direct submission of 
particularly controversial legal analyses to the intelligence committees.286 Koh’s 
proposals hold appeal because they build on existing oversight mechanisms and are 
unlikely to entail “unacceptable sacrifices in flexibility, [shallow] secrecy, or 
dispatch.”287 Special advisory commissions, currently in vogue on account of the 
9/11 Commission’s perceived success, would be slower, costlier, more constrained 
by their institutional form, and may raise their own legitimacy problems.288 
Mechanisms such as special commissions and inspectors general can be good for 
investigating previously deep executive secrets that have since become shallow; 
they cannot flexibly and effectively check the executive branch during the policy 
formulation window. 
The Bush era undermined confidence in the ability of the Gang of Eight to 
stand in for the full Congress. Gang-of-Eight notification laws are meant to temper 
the depth of the administration’s most sensitive plans with institutional and political 
diversity. Yet as the process is currently structured, the Gang has little capacity to 
constrain executive secret-keepers, or even to engage them in meaningful 
discussion.289 The Gang’s insularity also breeds a risk that members will become 
overly acculturated to their “insider” status. Strengthening the Gang of Eight could 
be accomplished by allowing cleared congressional staffers to participate in 
briefings (the simplest and most important reform, in my view), expanding or 
rotating the Gang’s membership, requiring executive officials to hold repeat 
meetings with additional Senators and Representatives upon request, or liberalizing 
the information-sharing rules between Gang members and their congressional 
colleagues. Both branches must ensure that the Gang of Eight does not come to 
supplant the intelligence committees and the relevant standing committees, and 
both houses of Congress must ensure that the intelligence committees do not hoard 
information. 
Reforms such as these suggest ways to balance the benefits of secret executive 
action with the costs of limiting the circle of secret-keepers. These reforms may 
also have a multiplier effect for reducing deep secrecy. The mere existence of such 
285. Koh, Iran-Contra, supra note 284, at 1327. 
286. KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 284, at 163-64; Koh, Iran-Contra, supra note 
284, at 1328-29. 
287. Koh, Iran-Contra, supra note 284, at 1327. More controversially, Congress could 
experiment with enhancing protections for whistleblowers who bring their concerns directly to a 
member, rather than to the press. 
288. For a stimulating discussion of advisory commissions’ promise and pitfalls, see Mark 
Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1239 (2008). 
289. See Kitrosser, supra note 92, at 1071 (noting common complaints that “the Gang of 
Eight as a group lacks the power to take recourse in response to what they’ve been told” and “that 
the group’s small size, combined with the absence of staffers in most briefings, makes meaningful 
deliberation and even adequate grasp of the issues unlikely”). 
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regularized structures, through which high-level executive actors must disclose 
their thinking to high-level congressional actors, can forge bonds of trust and 
collegiality that breed additional disclosures over time. Forcing the secret-keepers 
to confront their congressional counterparts would raise the social and 
psychological costs, as well as the legal ones, of withholding pertinent information. 
C. Internal Checks and Balances 
We do not need to leave the executive branch to reduce the depth of its secrets. 
One of this Article’s descriptive goals has been to show how two different state 
secrets, both known only to executive actors, can vary significantly across 
numerous dimensions of depth. By increasing and diversifying the pool of officials 
who are aware of a secret, we can capture some of the benefits of publicity without 
incurring all of the costs. Yet, while a tremendous amount of attention has been 
paid to the potential for Congress, the courts, and the press to check presidential 
secrecy, very little has been paid to internal mechanisms that can check secret-
keepers from within.290 
Neal Katyal recently moved to plug this hole in a much-discussed symposium 
piece on the “internal separation of powers.”291 Against those who would exalt 
executive energy and dispatch above all else, Katyal celebrates the internal friction, 
competition, and moderation that bureaucracy can provide. Intra-executive 
checking, Katyal argues, is needed now more than ever to compensate for “the 
demise of the congressional checking function.”292 His is a project in the “second-
best.”293 Katyal’s focus is not secrecy specifically, much less deep secrecy. But his 
aims are compatible with those of the deep secrecy critic, for executive decisions 
taken in deep secrecy can be seen as an extreme manifestation of the unchecked, 
unilateral “adventurism” that Katyal so deplores.294  
Among the many reforms Katyal suggests are: “bolster[ing] existing 
bureaucratic redundancy with legislation setting out inter-agency consultation 
requirements”;295 allowing the minority party in Congress to appoint additional 
agency ombudsmen during periods of one-party government;296 enhancing the 
290. Cf. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1385, 1388 (2008) (noting the “comparative dearth of scholarship analyzing the internal 
allocation of authority within branches, particularly the executive branch,” as compared to 
scholarship analyzing the allocation of authority across branches (citation omitted)). 
291. Katyal, supra note 259. 
292. Id. at 2320-21. The demise of the congressional checking function, in Katyal’s telling, 
is attributable to the massive growth of the federal bureaucracy, judicial abandonment of the 
nondelegation doctrine and the legislative veto, and aggressive presidential use of statutory 
interpretation, the veto power, and the party system. Id. 
293. Id. at 2316, 2322, 2344. 
294. Id. at 2318. 
295. Id. at 2327. 
296. Id. at 2347-48; see also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance 
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008) (proposing that Congress “create a cadre of informational 
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pay, status, and employment protections of civil servants so they are not 
marginalized by political appointees;297 and replicating across government the 
Foreign Service’s “Dissent Channel,” which allows foreign service officers to 
challenge department policy without fear of reprisal.298 Each of these reforms has 
the potential to reduce deep secrecy by empowering additional types of authorities 
to review any given plan or process. Katyal acknowledges the loss in efficiency the 
reforms would entail. But this worry is overrated, he says, because better policies 
will result. “[E]fficiency is not the equivalent of wi 299
In the most substantial criticism levied against Katyal to date, Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule point out that Katyal never actually explains why his “second-
best” solutions are, in fact, second-best to the traditional separation of powers, or 
why his solutions are desirable at all.300 I do not think this criticism is entirely fair. 
Katyal’s prescriptions are clearly, if subtextually, grounded in the commonsense 
belief that increasing the volume and diversity of deliberation will increase the 
quality of decision making.301  
But here is a (somewhat) more rigorous answer: internal friction, competition, 
and overlap will tend to decrease the depth of executive branch secrecy. This 
Article has shown that on utilitarian, liberal democratic, and constitutional grounds, 
that is generally a good thing. Even when a secret must remain an unknown 
unknown to the world at large, internal checking measures can serve a 
ombudsmen within the executive branch—with the highest security clearances—whose job is to 
ensure that the government deploys information collection techniques legally and nonarbitrarily”). 
297. Katyal, supra note 259, at 2330-35. Seth Kreimer similarly stresses the importance of 
the career bureaucracy for resisting secret abuses in Kreimer, supra note 74, at 1018-19; Kreimer, 
supra note 78, at 1143, 1217. 
298. Katyal, supra note 259, at 2328-29. 
299. Id. at 2345. There is nothing necessarily radical about using internal checking 
mechanisms in this way. The federal executive branch already has many “plural” characteristics, 
as reflected in the prevalence of independent agencies, entrenched bureaucrats, and 
interdepartmental jurisdictional redundancy. Many states have significantly more “fractured and 
dispersed” executives. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking 
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1896 (2001). Most state attorneys general, for 
example, do not serve at the will of the governor. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? 
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 
2446, 2448 (2006).  
300. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 283, at 897-98. 
301. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 259, at 2317 (“When the State and Defense Departments 
have to convince each other of why their view if right, . . . better decision making results.”). 
Posner and Vermeule also contend that Katyal’s proposals are “self-defeating,” in that a power-
maximizing President would never “adopt or enforce the internal separation of powers to check 
himself,” and a feckless Congress would never force him to. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 283, 
at 898. By “self-defeating,” Posner and Vermeule apparently mean “unrealistic.” Yet Posner and 
Vermeule do not explain why it is unrealistic to believe that Presidents would comply with 
internal checks for strategic or legal reasons, or to believe that the media and civil service could 
push Congress to patrol violations. More important, they fail to grapple with the fact that many of 
Katyal’s proposals would not actually check the President himself, but would instead check 
certain of his subordinates so that no one faction can entirely control the flow of information he 
receives. That kind of checking might be attractive even to an ill-motivated executive. 
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whistleblowing function (rooting out unlawful or nefarious conduct), a deliberative 
function (improving the quality of decision making), and a representational 
function (enhancing the democratic credibility of the policies chosen). Indeed, the 
analysis above suggests that some threshold amount of internal checking may be 
desirable entirely independent of the balance of power across the branches. 
Congress will never be able to constrain many facets of secret presidential decision 
making, nor should we necessarily want it to. On consequentialist grounds, at least, 
a combination of intrabranch openness and post hoc disclosure will sometimes be 
the optimal solution when content is extremely sensitive. 
Other reforms could complement Katyal’s. Harold Koh has made a number of 
suggestions to facilitate interagency review of proposed covert actions and to 
increase civilian and law enforcement representation on the National Security 
Council.302 A group of nineteen former OLC officials has argued that the Office 
should always consult with other Justice Department components when time 
permits, and should likewise seek to be consulted by White House lawyers.303 
Intelligence agencies have experimented with the use of internal “red teams” or “B 
Teams,” composed solely of agency staff, to challenge prevailing interpretations 
and to mimic the adversarial testing that outside debate would have provided.304 
The President could revise the executive order on national security information to 
encourage multiple signoffs for classifications or to expedite the declassification 
schedule for documents that have not been reviewed by multiple agencies. Even 
such simple gestures as reconfiguring the physical architecture of government, so 
that decisionmakers from different agencies work in closer proximity to one 
another, can invigorate the internal separation of powers without compromising 
external secrecy. 
In thinking about prescriptions such as these, the Bush administration’s 
handling of the “War on Terror” can serve once again as an instructive foil. In a 
subversive twist on traditional interagency consultation, a self-appointed, five-
member “War Council” became the President’s key advisory body on many 
matters.305 The CIA outmaneuvered the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Department of Defense to take on greatly expanded powers relating to 
interrogation, detention, and rendition.306 The Vice President and his deputy 
controlled significant national security policy areas on their own, hoarded 
302. KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 284, at 162-66. 
303. WALTER E. DELLINGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 5 
(2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs_OLC%20principles_white 
%20paper.pdf. 
304. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 57, at xvi (describing “B Teams”); ROBERTS, supra note 
12, at 46 (describing “red teams”). 
305. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 272, at 22-23; MAYER, supra note 270, at 66-68, 80-83, 
121. On one notable occasion, the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor learned of 
the War Council’s decision to try terrorism suspects in military commissions after the fact, from a 
news report. MAYER, supra note 270, at 82. 
306. This is one of the major themes of MAYER, supra note 270. 
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information, and steamrolled opponents.307 Major OLC opinions were produced 
not only without interagency consultation but also without intra-agency 
consultation; even the Attorney General was cut out.308  
The Guantanamo prison camp is often taken as the paradigm case of the 
administration’s zeal for secrecy, of its desire to wall off whole spheres of 
government activity, and whole living human beings, from outside scrutiny. But 
Guantanamo’s use as a detention center was widely debated within the 
administration and was disclosed to the public in short order. It is the CIA’s global 
network of “black site” prisons that is the better symbol of the administration’s zeal 
for deep secrecy.309 In perhaps the most striking example of depth being preferred 
to shallower norms, the Justice Department refused to provide the National 
Security Agency (NSA) with any legal justification for the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program—despite the fact that the famously tight-lipped NSA was running the 
program.310 The Bush administration provides a textbook study in how the urge to 
stifle dissent can push officials toward deeper and deeper secrecy, and consequently 
toward outcomes many would find radical, immoral, or unwise. 
D. Bureaucratic Culture 
There was significant internal dissent within the Bush administration, we now 
know. The dissenters just had no power; they were bullied into submission or 
exiled. Potential critics were weeded out ahead of time through a selection process 
that placed the highest premium on loyalty. The zeal for secrecy within the 
administration both reflected and reinforced the concentration of power among a 
small group of ideologically-aligned officials. The policymaking process was 
consistently rigged to block informational pathways that could have subjected deep 
secrets to additional forms of scrutiny and revision.  
A final lesson of the Bush years, then, is that beyond any of the discrete 
procedural and institutional reforms that might be tried, there is, in the end, no 
307. On the role of Vice President Cheney, see generally BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE 
CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008). On the outsized role of his counsel David Addington, see 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 272, at 76-90, 124-29, 169-71, 181-82; MAYER, supra note 270, at 48-71, 
300-04, 322-23. 
308. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 272, at 24 (describing OLC lawyer John Yoo’s 
practice of bypassing the Attorney General); Johnsen, supra note 7, at 1600 (noting that OLC 
appears not to have consulted with the Justice Department’s Criminal Division before issuing the 
Torture Memo); see also OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF. ET AL., UNCLASSIFIED 
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 10, 30 (2009), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/IGTSPReport090710.pdf (explaining that Yoo was the 
only OLC official “read into” the President’s domestic surveillance program for nearly two years 
and reporting the DOJ Inspector General’s conclusion that “it was extraordinary and inappropriate 
that a single DOJ attorney . . . was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the 
[program]”).  
309. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
310. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 272, at 181-82; LICHTBLAU, supra note 272, at 138; 
MAYER, supra note 270, at 68-70. 
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escaping the influence of bureaucratic culture. To minimize deep executive 
secrecy, formal mechanisms can only do so much. Congress and the judiciary can 
only do so much. If the keepers are determined to keep their secrets deep, no matter 
the cost, there is not much the outsider can do.311 
Consequently, it is vital that the government works to foster a culture that 
repudiates, rather than celebrates, deep secrecy. There is no obvious way to do this. 
Some of the formal prescriptions offered above might help: if interbranch 
consultation and interagency coordination become normalized as methods of 
reviewing secret plans, unilateral acts of secrecy may come to seem more 
provocative and suspicious.  
Probably more important, department heads must set an appropriate tone. In 
this spirit, nineteen former OLC officials (some of them now back in charge of the 
Office) recently issued a list of best practices to guide future administrations.312 
The guidelines emphasize the importance of adhering to norms of publicity and 
legality and of respecting the views of the coordinate branches. The guidelines also 
advise OLC attorneys to devote special scrutiny to decisions that are unlikely to 
face judicial review,313 a strategy that matches internal scrupulousness to external 
depth. More generally, department heads can follow the advice of the 9/11 
Commission and encourage their employees to abandon the Cold War intelligence 
officer’s cherished principle of “need to know” in favor of a culture of “need to 
share.”314 
Institutional design can also help, in several senses. Placing different types of 
officials in closer physical proximity lowers the cost of their interacting and can 
foster more diverse and dynamic deliberation, earlier in the policymaking process. 
Empowering civil service employees in secret decision making can counteract the 
likelihood of political appointees’ stronger affinity for clandestine adventurism, on 
the one hand, and for covering up mistakes, on the other. And broader use of 
mechanisms such as the “Dissent Channel”315 can help elevate the perception of 
internal dissent to a kind of civic contribution, rather than a deviant practice. This 
inversion might ironically be good for the maintenance of secrecy, as well as for 
the quality of governance, because disaffected employees who lack a Dissent 
Channel may find it more tempting to take their grievances to the outside world.316 
311. Something like this might be the meaning of Adam Samaha’s curious statement that 
“[t]here is one proper purpose for which informal channels of disclosure are uniquely suited: 
combating deep secrecy.” Samaha, supra note 51, at 948. Or perhaps Samaha just means that 
there is nothing like an old-fashioned leak for exploding a deep secret. As the previous Subparts 
reflect, I do not agree with the implication that formal channels are unsuitable or unhelpful for 
combating deep secrecy.  
312. DELLINGER ET AL., supra note 303. 
313. Id. at 2. 
314. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 417 (2004) (recommending that intelligence agencies promote “a ‘need-to-
share’ culture of integration”). 
315. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
316. Cf. supra note 64 and accompanying text (positing links between the depth of state 
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Internal whistleblowing can partially substitute for external whistleblowing. 
A bureaucratic culture that looks down upon deep secrets need not be a culture 
that looks down upon shallow ones. To the contrary, an institution that draws this 
distinction can breed greater respect for shallow secrets both within and beyond its 
walls. 
CONCLUSION 
In a powerful passage from its report on Cold-War-era intelligence agency 
abuses, the Church Committee asked: 
What can properly be concealed from the scrutiny of the American people, 
from various segments of the executive branch or from a duly constituted 
oversight body of their elected representatives? Assassination plots? The 
overthrow of an elected democratic government? Drug testing on unwitting 
American citizens? Obtaining millions of private cables? Massive domestic 
spying by the CIA and the military? The illegal opening of mail? Attempts by 
an agency of the government to blackmail a civil rights leader? These have 
occurred and each has been withheld from scrutiny by the public and the 
Congress by the label “secret intelligence.”317 
In this passage, the report calls into question not only the integrity of the 
“secret intelligence” label, but also the ability of any one group of officials to make 
appropriate decisions for the entire society. The value choices reflected in these 
unknown government activities, the Committee suggests, were profoundly wrong 
choices, and if the circle of information-insiders had been a little wider, they might 
never have been taken. The depth of these secret policies allowed them to persist—
and to undermine our laws and our well-being—even though Congress, the courts, 
the American people, and other segments of the executive branch would not have 
approved them.  
We are back where we began. In the wake of the George W. Bush 
administration, the United States finds itself wrestling once again with the need to 
check executive excess and adventurism, on the one hand, and the need to preserve 
executive energy and dispatch in a dangerous world, on the other. This tension will 
never be resolved fully, but the analysis here suggests one way to close the gap. 
Even among the subset of government secrets about which the public knows 
nothing, it has shown, the comparative insularity of the deeper secrets can pose a 
special threat to good governance, to liberal democratic values, even to the 
Constitution. We cannot and should not seek to prevent the executive branch from 
keeping secrets. We can and should seek to have them kept as shallow as possible. 
* * * 
State secrecy is such a vast and heterogeneous—and secretive—phenomenon 
secrets and the likelihood of leaks). 
317. 1 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 12 
(1976). 
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that it is difficult even to talk about it systematically. This Article has advanced a 
means of doing so. Whether or not any of the Article’s normative arguments or 
policy prescriptions have been convincing, I hope I have convinced the reader that 
it pays to attend to depth: that state secrets differ along a variety of stable 
dimensions; that we can draw meaningful distinctions among them without judging 
their content; and that there is a vast space between total public disclosure and 
maximal internal stealth, between sunlight and darkness.  
The understanding of depth developed here does not provide a substantive 
theory of state secrets. It provides a tool for theorizing them, a consilient 
framework for describing and assessing the infinite different things that 
governments do without the public’s full knowledge. Secrecy is a topic that by its 
nature tends to confound measurement and criticism. It need not confound them 
quite so much. 
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